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I. INTRODUCTION
The commerce clause as an instrument of federalism facili-
tates a system of government that places a national government
over fifty sovereign states. Federalism requires a balancing of the
interest in a unified national approach to government with the
competing interest in state sovereignty. As Justice Brennan
explained:
[O]ur Constitution is an instrument of federalism. The Constitution furnishes
the structure for the operation of the States with respect to the National
Government and with respect to each other.. . . Because there are 49 States
and much of the Nation's commercial activity is carried on by enterprises
having contacts with more States than one, a common and continuing prob-
lem of constitutional interpretation has been that of adjusting the demands
of individual States to regulate and tax these enterprises in light of the multi-
state nature of our federation.'
The commerce clause provides: "The Congress shall have
Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."' 2 The com-
merce clause has been interpreted not only as conferring power on
the national government to regulate commerce, but also as limiting
the states' power to interfere with commerce. This restriction on
state power often is referred to as the "negative implication of the
1. Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 532 (1959) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
2. U.S. CONsT. art. I. § 8, cl. 3.
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commerce clause" or as the "dormant commerce clause" principle.3
Under the authority of the commerce clause, the United States Su-
preme Court has struck down as unconstitutional a variety of state
regulatory and taxation measures as unduly burdening commerce.4
The primary purpose of the commerce clause is to foster free
trade and prevent commercial wars among the states.5 According
to the Court in H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond:'
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and every
craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have
free access to every market in the Nation, that no home embargoes will with-
hold his exports and no foreign state will by customs duties or regulations
exclude them. Likewise, every consumer may look to the free competition
from every producing area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation by
any.-
7
Although the states have legitimate interests in raising revenues
through taxes and in regulating commercial activity within their
boundaries, the states' taxing and police powers may not be used
3. See Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 106 S. Ct. 2369 (1986) (in
holding that a Florida aviation fuel tax did not violate the commerce clause, the Court
points out that dormant commerce clause principles do not apply in this case because the
federal government has acted affirmatively in the area and therefore it is not the responsi-
bility of the judiciary to determine whether state action threatens commerce clause values);
see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrruIONAL LAW § 6-2 (1978); Blumstein, Some Intersec-
tions of the Negative Commerce Clause and the New Federalism: The Case of Discrimina-
tory State Income Tax Treatment of Out-of-State Tax Exempt Bonds, 31 VAND. L. REv.
473 (1978); Case Note, The Constitutional Dilemma of State Tax Exemptions: Sears, Roe-
buck and Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 13 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 811, 818 (1981).
4. See, e.g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984) (holding that state
excise tax on alcoholic beverages, which exempted certain locally produced beverages, was
unconstitutional under the commerce clause); Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429
U.S. 318 (1977) (holding that New York transfer tax on securities transactions was unconsti-
tutional under the commerce clause because transactions involving an out-of-state sale were
taxed more heavily than most transactions involving a sale within the state); Great AtI. &
Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976) (holding that Mississippi regulation providing
that out-of-state milk could be sold in Mississippi only if the producing state would accept
Mississippi milk on a reciprocal basis was unconstitutional under the commerce clause);
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (holding that state regulatory order prohib-
iting taxpayer from shipping cantaloupes outside the state unless they were packed in con-
tainers approved by the state was an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce).
5. See McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944) (holding a state cannot
impose sales tax on sales to residents made out-of-state). According to the Court in McLeod,
"The very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to create an area of free trade among the
several States." Id. See also H.P. Hood and Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 366 U.S. 525, 539 (1949)
(holding that New York could not deny a license to an out-of-state milk distributor to ex-
pand its facilities within the state); c.f. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S.
318, 328 (1977) (citing with approval cases stating that the purpose of the commerce clause
is to encourage free trade among the states).
6. 366 U.S. 525 (1949).
7. Id. at 539.
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to erect barriers to interstate commerce." Barriers to interstate
commerce may result in states enacting retaliatory taxes, taxpayers
fractionalizing out-of-state operations into multiple local units,
and taxpayers being pressured into moving business operations
into the taxing state.' Because state governments are prone to
favor local interests and because out-of-state taxpayers have little
access to the taxing state's political process, the commerce clause is
needed to protect interstate commerce and avoid these deleterious
effects. 10 According to the Court in McGoldrick v. Berwind-White
Coal Mining Co.," commerce clause analysis must recognize the
danger that "to the extent that the burden falls on economic inter-
ests without the state, it is not likely to be alleviated by those po-
litical restraints which are normally exerted on legislation where it
affects adversely interests within the state."' 2
Under the contemporary approach to the commerce clause, 13
the Supreme Court has balanced the interests of the national gov-
ernment and the states by imposing four requirements on state
taxes. The Court first enunciated these requirements in 1977 in
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,'4 and the substantive analy-
sis often is referred to as the four-prong Complete Auto Transit
test. Accordingly, to protect the national interest, the commerce
clause has been interpreted as requiring that a state tax will be
valid only if "the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial
nexus with the taxing state, is fairly apportioned, does not discrim-
inate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the ser-
vices provided by the State.' 5
The prohibition of taxes that discriminate against interstate
8. See Maltz, The Burger Court, The Commerce Clause, and the Problem of Differen-
tial Treatment, 54 IND. L.J. 165, 175 (1979); Case Note, supra note 3, at 818-19.
9. See P. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOcAL TAXATION § 2.19, at 34-
35 (Supp. 1985) [hereinafter cited as P. HARTMAN, 1985 SUPPLEMENT].
10. See McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 45-46 n.2 (1940)
(holding that destination state could impose sales tax on interstate sales without violating
the commerce clause); 1 J. HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION 4.12 (1983); L. TRmE, supra note
3, § 6-5; Barrett, Constitutional Limitations on Discriminatory State Tax Laws, 2 N.Y.U.
INST. ON STATE AND LocAL TAX'N AND CONF. ON PROPERTY TAX'N 1-7 (1983); Maltz, supra
note 8, at 175.
11. 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
12. Id. at 46 n.2.
13. For a discussion of historical approaches to the commerce clause, see infra notes
70-77 and accompanying text.
14. 430 U.S. 274 (1977) (holding that state tax on the privilege of doing business in the
state did not violate the commerce clause when applied to an interstate activity).
15. Id. at 279. For a discussion of additional requirements applied when foreign com-
merce is involved, see infra notes 42, 61-67 and accompanying text.
1986] 883
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commerce is perhaps the most crucial element of the commerce
clause as applied to state taxation. In contrast to the antidis-
crimination requirement, which is not qualified, the remaining re-
strictions on state taxation (substantial nexus, fair apportionment,
and fair relation to services provided by the state) grant the state
some leeway in designing taxing provisions.16 Moreover, the sub-
stantial nexus, fair apportionment, and fairly related to services re-
quirements are to some extent independently incorporated by the
due process clause. 17 As Professor Tribe has pointed out, "The Su-
preme Court has traditionally recognized that a large part of the
rationale for granting Congress control over interstate commerce
'was to insure. . against discriminating State legislation.' "18
State taxes frequently are challenged as discriminating against
interstate or foreign commerce, and recently the United States Su-
preme Court has shown a willingness to strike down state taxes as
being discriminatory.19 In the past, however, the Court often up-
16. See J. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 10, 4.8, at 123. A tax will not be held unconstitu-
tional under these three prongs of Complete Auto Transit if the nexus is deemed substan-
tial, the apportionment is deemed fair, and the tax is fairly related to the services provided
by the. state.
It is unclear whether the Court will ever deem it necessary to likewise qualify the prohi-
bition against discrimination so as to allow taxation designed to promote legitimate state
goals which has an inadvertent discriminatory effect. For instance, a state tax intended to
promote environmental concerns could have the unintended result of taxing interstate com-
merce more heavily than intrastate commerce. Arguably, the legitimate state interest in pro-
tecting its environment may outweigh the negative effects on interstate commerce so that
the tax should be allowed to stand. Such a balancing of competing state and national inter-
ests is the approach used by the Supreme Court in analyzing regulatory cases under the
commerce clause. See, e.g., Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976); Pike
v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). Although the Court does not generally use such a
balancing approach in analyzing state tax discrimination under the commerce clause, it is
possible that a legitimate state interest in imposing a tax other than the typical purpose of
collecting revenue may warrant upholding a state tax with an inadvertent discriminatory
effect on interstate commerce. The Court suggested that such a result could be possible in
stating that discriminatory effects caused by a state tax statute "could be ignored only after
a showing of adequate justification." Halliburton Oii Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S.
64, 71 (1963) (holding that Louisiana use tax discriminated against interstate commerce
because the use tax base included the cost of labor and shop overhead, whereas the sales tax
on intrastate transactions was not imposed on these items).
17. See P. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMrrATIONS ON STATE AND LocAL TAXATION § 2:3 (1981);
J. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 10, 4.8, at 123.
18. L. TInE, supra note 3, § 6-16, at 354 (quoting Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 280
(1876)).
19. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388 (1984) (holding that New
York tax credit against DISC accumulated income for gross receipts attributable to export
shipments made from New York unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate com-
merce); Armco v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638 (1984) (holding that West Virginia wholesale gross
receipts tax unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate commerce by exempting lo-
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held state levies when challenged on discrimination grounds. 20 In
evaluating the case law, it sometimes is difficult to distinguish a
tax that legitimately "encourage[s] the growth and development of
intrastate commerce and industry" 21 from a tax that unconstitu-
tionally discriminates against interstate commerce. As Professor
Hartman has stated, "'Discrimination' is not a self-defining term.
It can be a delusively simple term, and once the question goes be-
yond the tax that is patently discriminatory on its face, much room
for controversy about hidden discrimination exists.
22
An analytical approach for determining when a state tax dis-
criminates against interstate or foreign commerce is needed. Such
an approach would help state legislators draft tax statutes consis-
tent with the mandates of the commerce clause. An analytical ap-
proach also would aid tax advisors, litigators, and adjudicators in
determining whether a particular state tax is subject to invalida-
tion as being discriminatory against interstate or foreign com-
merce. Other possible methods of studying state tax discrimination
under the commerce clause that do not rely on an analytical ap-
proach have less potential as a predictive tool for evaluating when
a state tax may be deemed unconstitutional. For example, studying
state tax discrimination cases by reviewing the taxing mechanism
employed is of little use in predicting constitutionality since any
mechanism (direct tax, exemption, credits, etc.) can be used to dis-
criminate. Nor does categorizing the subject of discrimination as
interstate goods, taxpayers, or transactions help in making the de-
termination because state discrimination may weigh against any of
these categories. Finally, a case-by-case analysis of how courts have
defined discrimination for state tax purposes is helpful in ob-
cal manufacturers from tax); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984); Maryland
v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981) (holding that Louisiana's first-use tax on natural gas
brought into Louisiana unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate commerce be-
cause various exemptions and credits operated to burden only the gas moving out of the
state).
20. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981) (holding that
Montana severance tax on coal did not discriminate against interstate commerce even
though most of the coal was shipped outside the state); Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U.S. 199
(1961) (holding that Alaska tax on the business of operating freezer ships did not unconsti-
tutionally burden interstate commerce even though the freezer ships transported salmon
out-of-state); Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937) (holding that use tax on
goods purchased outside the state but brought into the state for use did not discriminate
against interstate commerce).
21. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 336
(1977).
22. P. HARTMAN, supra note 17, § 2:19, at 122-23 (1981); see also J. HELLERSTEIN, supra
note 10, % 4.12[5], at 147.
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taining a general understanding of the issue, but fails to provide a
method for predicting when a particular tax will be deemed
discriminatory.
This Article develops an analytical approach to state tax dis-
crimination under the commerce clause. The approach can be used
in determining whether a particular state tax discriminates against
interstate or foreign commerce. The approach sets forth six ques-
tions that must be answered consecutively to determine whether a
state tax is unconstitutionally discriminatory under the commerce
clause. These six questions are:
(1) Is the state tax subject to commerce clause scrutiny?
(2) Is there disparate tax treatment?
(3) Is the inequality being challenged caused by the state tax
statute?
(4) Does the unequal treatment weigh against a protected class
of commerce?
(5) Does the unequal treatment weigh in favor of local
commerce?
(6) Can any other law alter the commerce clause result?
This Article examines these questions and explores the ways in
which they may be answered.
This analytical approach relates only to discrimination. Other
commerce clause requirements (substantial nexus, fair apportion-
ment, and fair relation to services provided) are not examined.
Furthermore, the focus of this Article is on state tax discrimination
under the commerce clause and not on other constitutional or stat-
utory provisions. This Article will consider, however, whether any
other law can override the commerce clause. This Article also will
examine how the commerce clause prohibition against state tax
discrimination compares to other constitutional or statutory limits
on discrimination in state taxation.
II. THE SCOPE OF COMMERCE CLAUSE SCRUTINY
In considering whether a state tax unconstitutionally discrimi-
nates against interstate or foreign commerce, a court first must de-
termine whether the tax is subject to commerce clause scrutiny. If
the tax is not subject to judicial scrutiny under the commerce
clause, then no further inquiry under this constitutional provision
is warranted. To subject a state tax to commerce clause scrutiny,
two conditions must be met. First, the state tax must affect com-




A. The Scope of Commerce
For constitutional purposes "commerce" is defined very
broadly. As Chief Justice Marshall stated in Gibbons v. Ogden,
"Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is
intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse between na-
tions, and parts of nations, in all its branches."2 3 Accordingly, most
economic activity is considered commerce.24 Professional sports,
theatrical productions, legal services, and the operations of a pub-
lic utility holding company all constitute commerce. 25 Although in-
surance originally was held not to constitute commerce,28 this view
later was repudiated.21 Nevertheless, Congress subsequently has
removed the commerce clause barrier to state regulation of the in-
surance business. 28 Thus, in determining whether a state tax is
subject to commerce clause scrutiny, the first condition, that com-
merce must be involved, almost always is satisfied.
B. Connection with Interstate or Foreign Commerce
As stated above, for a tax on commerce to be subject to judi-
cial review under the commerce clause, not only must the taxpayer
be engaged in commerce, but that commerce also may be required
to have some connection with interstate or foreign business. Over
the years the law has evolved to diminish the significance of the
required connection between the state tax and interstate or foreign
commerce. Arguably, the contemporary commerce clause analysis
under Complete Auto Transit renders this requirement obsolete.
Some relationship with interstate or foreign business, however, al-
ways has been and may still remain part of commerce clause analy-
sis by the courts.
23. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-90 (1824) (New York law granting
monopoly position in steam navigation of its waters to two individuals held invalid under
the commerce clause).
24. See J. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 10, 4.1, at 85-86.
25. Id. at 85-86.
26. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183 (1868) (holding that state licensing
statute for out-of-state insurance companies was not invalid under the commerce clause
because the insurance business did not constitute commerce).
27. See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944) (hold-
ing that a fire insurance company that conducted a substantial part of its business transac-
tions across state lines was engaged in interstate commerce and subject to regulation by
Congress under the commerce clause).
28. See McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982). For a discussion of





Historically, the connection between a state tax and interstate
commerce was all-important for commerce clause analysis because
the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce was immune from
state taxation.29 The connection between the tax and interstate
commerce was the beginning and also the end of commerce clause
inquiry for state tax purposes. In the past, any direct tax on inter-
state commerce was unconstitutional under the commerce clause.
3 0
Hence, states could not tax goods in transit in interstate com-
merce;1 it therefore was crucial to determine when goods were in
interstate commerce. Interstate commerce was deemed to have
commenced when goods started transportation in a continuous
route or journey to another state.3 2 Interruption of the journey
across state lines would take the goods out of interstate commerce
if the interruption served the business purposes of the owner
rather than being necessitated by the exigencies of travel.
3 3
Interstate commerce formerly was viewed as having a begin-
ning and an end, and any business preceding the interstate com-
merce or occurring after its conclusion was susceptible to state tax-
ation.3 ' Activities such as manufacturing, mining, and publishing
were held to be local business subject to tax even though the goods
produced were largely intended for sale outside the state.3 5 The
distinction drawn between purely local business and interstate
commerce was pivotal in determining taxability under the com-
merce clause.
These old approaches to commerce clause analysis have been
criticized as depending on illusory distinctions.3 " One commentator
remarked: "The 'principles' formerly applied by the Court made
rational analysis of tax statutes almost impossible. At times, it
29. See Spector Motor Serv. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951) (holding that franchise
tax on privilege of doing business within the state was invalid as applied to exclusively in-
terstate business).
30. See P. HARTMAN, supra note 17, § 2:13.
31. See Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886) (holding that the state could impose property
tax on logs cut in-state waiting to be shipped out-of-state because the logs had not yet been
started in the course of interstate transportation but state could not impose property tax on
those logs cut out-of-state because these logs had been started on a journey in interstate
commerce); P. HARTMAN, supra note 17, § 2:18.
32. See Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. at 528.
33. J. HELLESTEIN, supra note 10, 4.3.
34. Id. 1 4.4[1].
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., P. HARTMAN, supra note 17, § 2:16; J. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 10,
4.4[1]; L. TRmE, supra note 3, § 6-14; Barrett, supra note 10, § 1.03[1][d].
[Vol. 39:879
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seemed that constitutional questions-some obviously of major fi-
nancial importance to the states and affected parties-were de-
cided literally on the basis of labels. '37 In particular, Professor
Hartman has ridiculed the distinction between the tax imposed on
the net income of an interstate business that the Court upheld in
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota"8 and the
tax on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce measured
by net income that the Court held unconstitutional in Spector Mo-
tor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor.3 9 As Professor Hartman colorfully
explained:
A nondiscriminatory privilege tax 'measured by' apportioned net income
from interstate commerce would seem to present, in practical consequence,
no more danger of suppressing or hampering that commerce than a tax im-
posed directly upon that same income. Both taxes would yield the same
amount of revenue. Thus, a great principle of constitutional law hinged on a
judicially hatched distinction that has as much economic substance as soup
made from the shadow of an emaciated sparrow on a cloudy day.4 0
2. Current Approach
Currently, interstate and foreign commerce can be taxed if
certain requirements are met. In regard to interstate commerce, a
state tax will be held valid only if the following four prongs of
Complete Auto Transit are satisfied: the tax must be applied to an
activity having a substantial nexus with the taxing state; the tax
must be fairly apportioned; the tax must not discriminate against
interstate commerce; and the tax must be fairly related to the ser-
vices provided by the state.41 A state tax affecting foreign com-
merce must satisfy two additional requirements: the tax must not
create a substantial risk of multiple international taxation, and the
tax must not prevent the federal government from "speaking with
one voice" when regulating commercial relations with foreign
governments.
4 2
As opposed to historical approaches to commerce clause analy-
sis, under the current approach taxability generally is not depen-
dent on whether the levy falls upon interstate commerce. Clearly, a
37. Barrett, supra note 10, § 1.03[1][d], at 1-11.
38. 358 U.S. 450 (1959) (holding that net income from the exclusively interstate opera-
tions of a foreign corporation may be subjected to state taxation).
39. 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
40. P. HARTMAN, supra note 17, § 2:16, at 86 (emphasis in original).
41. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
42. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 451-52 (1979) (holding
that California ad valorem property tax as applied to cargo containers of Japanese shipping
companies unconstitutionally burdened foreign commerce).
1986]
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state tax imposed directly on the privilege of engaging in interstate
commerce is no longer a per se violation of the commerce clause.'3
Nonetheless, it is unclear under the current approach whether a
state can impose a property tax on goods in transit in interstate
commerce. 44 If such a tax is prohibited, then taxability still may
turn on whether goods are in transit in interstate commerce. As
Professor Jerome Hellerstein suggests, however, the logic behind
prohibiting such a state tax should not simply be that the goods
are in interstate commerce; rather, because the goods are in inter-
state commerce, one prong of the Complete Auto Transit require-
ments has not been satisfied.'5
Although commerce clause analysis no longer turns on
whether a tax is imposed on interstate or foreign commerce, an
element of interstate or foreign business may be necessary before
commerce clause protection even can be invoked. In determining
whether the requisite interstate or foreign connection is present, it
is helpful to categorize the commerce involved. These categories
are useful in assessing the necessary connection between the tax
and interstate or foreign commerce. Interstate commerce should be
divided between commerce originating outside the taxing state and
commerce originating inside the taxing state. Likewise, foreign
commerce should be divided between commerce originating outside
the United States and commerce originating inside the United
States.
3. Interstate Commerce Originating from Outside the Taxing
State
Taxation of commerce originating from outside the taxing
state clearly is subject to interstate commerce clause scrutiny.
Hence, business that originates out-of-state but crosses into the
state may be taxed only if the tax statute satisfies the four-part
Complete Auto Transit test, including the requirement that the
tax not discriminate against interstate commerce. Specifically, in
regard to out-of-state business crossing into the state, the Supreme
Court will scrutinize the taxation of various types of subjects under
the commerce clause. The Court has analyzed the taxation of im-
43. See Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 288-89.
44. See P. HARTMAN, supra note 17, § 2:18; J. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 10, 1 4.11.
45. See J. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 10, 4.11. Assuming that the tax on goods in
transit is fairly apportioned to the mileage or ton-miles of freight in the state, there still
may be a problem with satisfying the requirements of adequate nexus and fair relation of
the tax to the services provided.
890 [Vol. 39:879
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ported goods, 46 taxation of transactions, 47 and taxation of nonresi-
dents.4" Taxation of out-of-state business over which the state has
taxing jurisdiction also is subject to commerce clause scrutiny.
Thus, a state may not impose a greater tax burden on transactions
taking place outside the state than on similar transactions con-
ducted within the state.49 Nor may a state tax the income associ-
ated with out-of-state activity more heavily than the income asso-
ciated with in-state activity.
50
4. Interstate Commerce Originating from Inside the Taxing State
Taxation of commerce originating from inside the taxing state
may be subject to judicial scrutiny under the commerce clause only
if the taxation has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
Under the so-called affectation doctrine, "all local activities which
have an adverse bearing or effect upon the interstate commerce"
are subject to commerce clause scrutiny. 51 According to the Su-
preme Court in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana,52 "State
taxes levied on a 'local' activity preceding entry of the goods into
interstate commerce may substantially affect interstate commerce,
and this effect is the proper focus of Commerce Clause inquiry. '53
In Commonwealth Edison the Court addressed a commerce
clause challenge to a state severance tax imposed on goods prior to
their entry into the stream of interstate commerce.5 The Court
concluded that although mining was a local activity, the practical
effect of the tax on interstate commerce necessitated judicial re-
view under the Complete Auto Transit test.5 5 A logical inference
from Commonwealth Edison is that certain local taxation that
does not substantially affect interstate commerce will not be sub-
46. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984) (holding that a state may
not impose a greater tax burden on imported goods than on locally produced goods).
47. See Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638 (1984) (holding that a state cannot im-
pose a tax on the wholesaling of goods produced out-of-state when the wholesaling of goods
produced in-state was exempt from taxation). According to the Court, "[A] state may not
tax a transaction or incident more heavily when it crosses state lines than when it occurs
entirely within the state." Id. at 642.
48. See Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 274 (tax imposed on foreign corporation
for the privilege of doing business in the state subject to commerce clause scrutiny but held
valid under the four-prong test).
49. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
50. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388 (1984).
51. M. FORKOSCH, CONSTrrUTiONAL LAW § 220, at 234 (2nd ed. 1969).
52. 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
53. Id. at 616.
54. Id. at 617.
55. Id. at 615-17.
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ject to commerce clause review. There is a legitimate need for
states to raise revenues, and hence, certain taxation of local activ-
ity must be allowed even though this taxation somehow affects in-
terstate commerce. Consequently, courts may scrutinize only those
taxes imposing substantial effects on interstate commerce. Argua-
bly, the clearest example of state taxation that should not be sub-
ject to commerce clause review is ad valorem real property taxa-
tion. If local real property taxes affect interstate commerce at all,
the effect truly may be inconsequential.
Of course, most state taxation is not as far removed from in-
terstate commerce as the taxation of real property. Under this ap-
proach, one problem in determining the applicability of the Com-
plete Auto Transit analysis is distinguishing local commerce that
substantially affects interstate commerce from local commerce that
does not have this substantial effect. Moreover, it may be unwise
for the judiciary even to attempt to make this distinction. Argua-
bly, the distinction between a state tax that substantially affects
interstate commerce and a state tax that does not is just as artifi-
cial and impractical as the former judicial distinction between a
tax on interstate commerce and a tax on intrastate commerce. Per-
haps evolving jurisprudence calls for complete abandonment of a
requirement that the tax somehow be connected with interstate or
foreign commerce. Under this approach, taxes on purely local com-
merce would be subject to the requirements of the Complete Auto
Transit test, but most such taxes would have little difficulty in
passing the test.
Although the analysis is very different, the results are fre-
quently the same under the historical commerce clause approach,
which allowed taxation of local activity, and the contemporary ap-
proach, which would subject taxation of local activity substantially
affecting interstate commerce to the Complete Auto Transit test.
Thus, it is interesting to compare Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord,5
which the Supreme Court decided in 1923, with Commonwealth
Edison Co. v. Montana,57 decided in 1981. In Oliver Iron Mining
the Court held that an occupation tax on the value of ore mined in
the taxing state but sold in other states did not violate the com-
merce clause because mining was a local business, not interstate
commerce. Similarly, in Commonwealth Edison the Court held
that a severance tax on coal mined in the taxing state but sold in
other states did not violate the commerce clause because the Corn-
56. 262 U.S. 172 (1923).
57. 453 U.S. 609 (1981).
892 [Vol. 39:879
STATE TAX DISCRIMINATION
plete Auto Transit test was satisfied.
In both Oliver Iron Mining and Commonwealth Edison the
taxpayers contended that the tax unconstitutionally burdened in-
terstate commerce because the vast majority of the natural re-
source subject to tax was transported to markets out-of-state.5 8
This argument, however, did not sway the Court either in 1923 or
in 1981. According to the Court in Oliver Iron Mining, "Mining is
not interstate commerce, but, like manufacturing, is a local busi-
ness subject to local regulation and taxation. ' 5 9 In Commonwealth
Edison the Court concluded that there was no commerce clause
violation because the Montana tax "comports with the require-
ments of the Complete Auto Transit test."60 In short, classification
as a tax on local activity no longer assures commerce clause immu-
nity, but the tax still may be valid either because it does not sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce or because it passes the Com-
plete Auto Transit test.
5. Foreign Commerce
In regard to foreign commerce clause protection, distinguish-
ing between commerce originating from outside the United States
and commerce originating from inside the United States may be
useful. When commerce originates from outside the United States,
commerce clause scrutiny clearly is warranted, and state taxation
of such commerce should be subjected to the Complete Auto
Transit requirements. In addition, the state taxation also may be
subject to the two additional requirements enunciated in Japan
Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles:61 the tax (1) must not create a
substantial risk of international multiple taxation and (2) must not
prevent the federal government from "speaking with one voice
when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments."6
Although Japan Line involved commerce originating in Japan,63
the case was decided on narrow grounds; the Court pointed out
that the case involved instrumentalities of commerce owned,
based, and registered abroad that were used exclusively in interna-
tional commerce.64 Thus, it is unclear whether all foreign com-
58. See Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 617-18; Oliver Iron Mining, 262 U.S. at
177.
59. 262 U.S. at 178.
60. 453 U.S. at 629.
61. 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
62. Id. at 452.
63. Id. at 436.
64. Id. at 444. See also Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 106 S. Ct.
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merce originating from outside the United States will be granted
the added protection from state taxation provided to the Japan
Line taxpayers.6 5
When commerce originates inside the United States, foreign
commerce clause scrutiny presumably may be warranted only
when the local taxation has a substantial effect on foreign com-
merce. Although the Supreme Court has not as yet applied the
substantial effects test to taxation of foreign commerce originating
in the taxing state,66 it may be logical to extend the test to this
type of foreign commerce. It appears a fortiori that forms of state
taxation so inherently local in nature that they affect interstate
commerce inconsequentially also probably affect foreign commerce
inconsequentially. Accordingly, assuming that the Commonwealth
Edison analysis applies to foreign commerce, it may be necessary
for the taxpayer to show that the state tax has a substantial effect
on foreign commerce originating in the state before commerce
2369 (1986) (holding that Florida fuel tax on the sale of aviation fuel used by foreign airlines
does not violate the commerce clause). The two additional prongs set forth in Japan Line
were considered by the Court in Wardair because the case involved foreign-owned instru-
mentalities of commerce engaged in foreign commerce.
65. In an amicus curiae brief recently filed with a federal district court, the United
States Attorney General suggested that the two additional prongs of Japan Line should
have a broad application. Amicus Curiae Brief for United States at 17, Alcan Aluminum,
Ltd. v. Franchise Tax Bd., Civil Action No. 84-C-6932 (N.D. Ill. July 30, 1986). Imperial
Chemical Indus. v. Franchise Tax Bd., Civil Action No. 84-C-8906 (N.D. Ill. July 30, 1986).
These cases involve challenges to California's worldwide unitary business principle as ap-
plied to multinational enterprises with a foreign parent corporation. According to the Attor-
ney General, the California worldwide unitary method of apportionment should be held un-
constitutional as applied in these cases since this method enhances a risk of multiple
taxation and impairs federal uniformity in foreign policy. Thus, the Attorney General would
extend the two additional prongs of Japan Line.
It is interesting to note, however, that due to an apparent misunderstanding of the term
"instrumentality of commerce," the Attorney General fails to see how the application of the
two additional prongs in these cases would constitute an extension of Japan Line. Instru-
mentalities of commerce generally are equated with vehicles such as the shipping compa-
nies' vessels and cargo containers involved in Japan Line. The Attorney General, however,
refers to corporations engaged in foreign commerce as "instrumentalities of foreign com-
merce." See Amicus Curiae Brief of United States at 17 Alcan Aluminum.
66. But see Department of Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Co's.,
435 U.S. 734 (1978). In this case, the Court held that Washington's business and occupation
tax as applied to the activity of stevedoring within the state was constitutional. Although
the stevedoring activity involved, in part, the loading of imports and exports, the Court did
not analyze the case in terms of foreign commerce. Instead, the case was considered under
the interstate commerce clause and the import-export clause. As a result, the Court did not
clarify the scope of foreign commerce clause protection. No distinction between local taxa-
tion substantially affecting foreign commerce and local taxation not substantially affecting
foreign commerce was made. Moreover, the Court did not address the issue of additional
protection afforded to foreign commerce until the following year in Japan Line.
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clause scrutiny even is warranted. Again, it is questionable whether
the "substantial effect" distinction is advisable. Subjecting all state
taxation to commerce clause review may be preferable.
Assuming the taxpayer has established that the state tax on
commerce originating in the United States is subject to commerce
clause scrutiny, it is unclear what requirements the tax must sat-
isfy to survive this scrutiny. Clearly, the four-prong Complete Auto
Transit test must be satisfied. These four requirements have been
universally applied in all contemporary commerce clause cases.
The applicability of the additional two prongs set forth in Japan
Line, however, is uncertain. Japan Line did not involve foreign
commerce originating in the United States, and the Court itself
limited its decision by explicitly avoiding questions of the taxabil-
ity "of domestically owned instrumentalities engaged in foreign
commerce." 67 Moreover, it may be difficult to distinguish between
interstate and foreign commerce in cases involving the taxation of
commerce originating in one state, traveling interstate, and then
leaving the country. In these cases it is unclear whether the tax
imposed by the state in which the commerce originates should be
subject to only the Complete Auto Transit requirements or also
the additional requirements of Japan Line. Perhaps, the substan-
tial effects test is needed to distinguish between interstate com-
merce clause protection and foreign commerce clause protection.
In other words, only those state taxes substantially affecting for-
eign commerce would have to satisfy the additional two prongs of
Japan Line.
III. DISPARATE TAX TREATMENT
Under contemporary commerce clause analysis, it is crucial to
determine what constitutes discrimination for state tax purposes.
A state tax invalidated solely on commerce clause grounds is likely
to be found to discriminate against interstate commerce. The sig-
nificance of the antidiscrimination provision of the commerce
clause results in part because of the "illusory" nature of the re-
maining three Complete Auto Transit restrictions on state taxa-
tion. 8 Moreover, the antidiscrimination requirement, unlike some
of the other Complete Auto Transit requirements, is not reiterated
by the due process clause. 9 In light of its significance and unique-
67. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 444 n.7. The Court also did not reach questions concern-
ing the taxability of foreign owned instrumentalities engaged in interstate commerce.
68. See J. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 10, % 4.8, at 123.
69. See P. HARTMAN, supra note 17.
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ness, this Article analyzes the requirement that a state tax not dis-
criminate against interstate commerce. This Article will not dwell
on the other requirements that the commerce clause imposes on
state taxation.
A. Evolution of Commerce Clause Adjudication
Under earlier approaches to the commerce clause, the validity
of state tax measures did not turn on whether the tax discrimi-
nated against interstate commerce.70 Originally, the commerce
clause was viewed as prohibiting virtually all state taxation of in-
terstate commerce.7 1 By the midpart of the last century, it was be-
lieved that the commerce clause prohibited some, but not all, state
taxation of interstate commerce and that a distinction could be
made between areas of interstate commerce in which there was
need for national tax uniformity and areas in which local taxation
was permissible. In the 1890s new terminology was introduced so
that "direct" taxes on interstate commerce were invalid, whereas
"indirect" taxes on interstate commerce were valid.
73
Beginning in 1938 state taxes were invalidated under the com-
merce clause if they threatened interstate commerce with cumula-
tive burdens not imposed on local commerce. 4 Freeman v.
Hewit,7 5 decided in 1946, marked a temporary reversion to the for-
malistic distinction between direct and indirect taxes on interstate
commerce. Not long after Freeman, however, the Supreme Court
abandoned the direct/indirect burdens test and adopted an ap-
proach that focused on multiple burdens.76 According to Professor
70. See id. §§ 2.10-2.16.
71. See Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419 (1827) (state license provision applied to im-
porters of foreign goods held unconstitutional).
72. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 54 U.S. 299, 319 (1851) (holding that state law
requiring vessel to pay fee if it did not use a pilot was constitutional because the subject of
regulation demanded local diversity, not national uniformity).
73. See Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, 165 U.S. 194 (1897) (property tax on instrumen-
talities of interstate commerce held valid under the commerce clause because it was not
considered to be a direct tax on interstate commerce).
74. See Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938) (privilege tax
on the business of publishing magazines measured by the gross receipts from the sale of
advertising held constitutional because there was no danger of this type of tax resulting in
cumulative burdens on interstate commerce).
75. 329 U.S. 249 (1946) (holding that Indiana could not tax gross receipts from sale of
securities by Indiana resident on New York Stock Exchange because the tax was considered
to be a direct tax on interstate commerce).
76. See Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959)
(holding that a state could impose an apportioned income tax on a foreign corporation en-
gaged in interstate commerce in part because there was no showing that such taxation
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Hartman, this new version of the multiple burdens test required
the taxpayer to show actual multiple taxation rather than just the
mere risk of multiple taxation."
The 1977 Complete Auto Transit decision marked a break-
through in state tax adjudication under the commerce clause.
78
The Court enunciated an approach grounded in economic reality
rather than in formalistic distinctions 9 Complete Auto Transit
provides an analytical framework heretofore lacking in the Court's
approach to state taxation under the commerce clause. Generally,
more state taxes will be held valid under the commerce clause
when using the Complete Auto Transit test than under the old
approaches. 80 Nonetheless, commentators agree that the logic and
predictability of the Complete Auto Transit test are preferable to
the arbitrary and capricious nature of the old approaches. 1 Al-
though the Complete Auto Transit test is more logical and pre-
dictable, it provides only the bare frame of a complete analytical
approach to state tax discrimination. Even with Complete Auto
Transit, there is considerable uncertainty in determining when a
state tax is valid under the commerce clause. A major element of
this uncertainty derives from the difficulty in determining what
constitutes discrimination. Discussed below are factors that must
be considered when scrutinizing a state tax provision for discrimi-
nation against interstate or foreign commerce.
would subject interstate commerce to multiple taxation).
77. P. HARTMAN, supra note 17, § 2:16. Whether the multiple burden test still stands
and, if so, whether the mere risk or the actuality of multiple taxation of interstate commerce
is necessary to invalidate a state tax will be considered below. See infra notes 187-214 and
accompanying text.
78. See Barrett, supra note 10, § 1.03[2].
79. Id. at 1-15. According to Barrett, Complete Auto Transit is a "bellweather deci-
sion marking a shift away from adjudicating the constitutionality of tax measures by labels
and to the use of practically oriented economic analysis." Id. See also P. HARTMAN, supra
note 17, § 2:17 at 91; L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 6-14, at 345.
80. Barrett, supra note 10, § 1.0312]. According to Barrett, the tendency for the old
approaches to favor taxpayer challenges to state taxes under the commerce clause is illus-
trated by the result in Complete Auto Transit. "The case upheld a tax that had been found
unconstitutional less than three decades earlier. Thus, the new doctrine may well be more
hospitable than the old verbal formulas to the broad range of taxes that can meet its re-
quirements." Id. at 1-15.




B. The Supreme Court's Formulations of State Tax
Discrimination
The Supreme Court has developed various formulations of
what constitutes state tax discrimination. Basically, the Court re-
lies on an analysis of relative tax burdens. State tax discrimination
is, then, in part, inequality resulting from a state imposing greater
state tax burdens on certain taxpayers than on others. According
to the Court in Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, "[A] State may not tax a
transaction or incident more heavily when it crosses state lines
than when it occurs entirely within the State."'82 Moreover, as de-
scribed in Commonwealth Edison, state tax discrimination is "dif-
ferential tax treatment of interstate and intrastate commerce."83
Hence, the Court has "struck down state tax statutes that en-
couraged the development of local industry by means of taxing
measures that imposed greater burdens on economic activities tak-
ing place outside the State than were placed on similar activities
within the State."'84 In short, a state tax statute cannot provide "a
direct commercial advantage to local business. "85
On another level, the Court focuses on the state tax's effect on
economic decisionmaking. Under this analysis, state tax discrimi-
nation is viewed as an interference with independent decisionmak-
ing in a free market economy. Thus, discrimination is seen as,
among other things, tending "to neutralize [economic] advantages
belonging to the place of origin."86 According to this approach, the
use tax is permissible even though it was designed to keep domes-
tic purchasers from avoiding the local sales tax by purchasing
goods out-of-state. In such a situation, the use tax is not viewed as
neutralizing an advantage belonging to the place of origin of goods
because the advantage nonresident sellers possess is deemed at-
tributable to the sales tax of the taxing state. 7 Thus, taken to-
gether, the complementary sales and use taxes of the state do not
affect a taxpayer's decision regarding in which state to purchase an
item.88 Instead, this decision is left to the taxpayer's assessment of
82. 467 U.S. 638, 642.
83. 453 U.S. at 618.
84. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 466 U.S. at 403-04.
85. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co., 358 U.S. at 457.
86. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935) (holding that a state could
not insulate in-state milk producers from out-of-state competition by establishing a mini-
mum price that in-state retailers had to pay their suppliers, wherever situated).
87. See Varat, State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CH. L. REV. 487,
544-46 (1981).
88. For a discussion of the complementary tax doctrine, see infra notes 137-85 and
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the market devoid of any consideration of state taxes.
State tax discrimination is seen as an interference with the
businessman's decision regarding where he should locate his busi-
ness. This discrimination "encourages an out-of-state operator to
become a resident in order to compete on equal terms."89 Thus, in
Maryland v. Louisiana" the Supreme Court held that the Louisi-
ana first use tax paid on the first use of outer continental shelf
(OCS) natural gas brought into the state was unconstitutional
under the commerce clause because the tax was allowed as a credit
against other state taxes. Consequently, the first use tax generally
did not burden in-state consumers of the OCS gas. According to
the Court, "The obvious economic effect of this Severance Tax
Credit is to encourage natural gas owners involved in the produc-
tion of OCS gas to invest in mineral exploration and development
within Louisiana rather than to invest in further OCS development
or in production in other States."9 1 In short, as stated in Boston
Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission,92 a discriminatory tax
statute "forecloses tax-neutral decisions."93
C. Burden of Proving Disparate Tax Treatment
It is important to note that a taxpayer who is challenging a
state tax statute under the commerce clause carries the burden of
proving that discrimination exists. The Supreme Court pointed out
in Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue,9 4 "[A] taxpayer claiming




89. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64, 72 (1963).
90. 451 U.S. 725 (1981).
91. Id. at 757.
92. 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
93. Id. at 331.
94. 340 U.S. 534 (1951) (holding that gross receipts tax on sales to residents by out-of-
state corporation with office in-state was valid unless taxpayer could show that particular
sales were disassociated from the local business).
95. Id. at 537. The Court explains this burden of proof by stating that it cannot be
met as follows:
by showing a fair difference of opinion which as an original matter might be de-
cided differently. This corporation, by submitting itself to the taxing power [of the
state], likewise submitted itself to its judicial power to construe and apply its taxing
statute insofar as it keeps within constitutional bounds. Of course, in constitutional
cases, we have power to examine the whole record to arrive at an independent judg-
ment as to whether constitutional rights have been invaded, but that does not mean
that we will re-examine, as a court of first instance, findings of fact supported by sub-
stantial evidence.
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Although the taxpayer carries the burden of proving that tax
discrimination exists, the taxpayer need not show the extent of dis-
parate tax treatment or demonstrate a minimal level of discrimina-
tory effect. Hence, in Maryland v. Louisiana the Supreme Court
stated:
It may be true that further hearings would be required to provide a precise
determination of the extent of the discrimination in this case, but this is an
insufficient reason for not now declaring the Tax unconstitutional and elimi-
nating the discrimination. We need not know how unequal the Tax is before
concluding that it unconstitutionally discriminates."
Moreover, in Bacchus Imports a tax statute that discriminated
against out-of-state alcoholic beverage distributors could not be
saved merely because the in-state alcoholic beverage distributors
exempted from the tax did not pose a "competitive threat. 9 7
To sustain the burden of proof, it should be sufficient for the
taxpayer to show the risk, as opposed to the actuality, of disparate
tax treatment. Language in Supreme Court opinions suggesting
that actual discrimination is necessary to render a statute uncon-
stitutional relates to the fair apportionment requirement, not the
antidiscrimination requirement of Complete Auto Transit.9 s When
the challenge involves a claim of discrimination rather than a claim
of multiple taxation, 9 the interstate taxpayer should not be re-
Id. at 537-38.
The taxpayer challenging the tax must show, then, that the tax violated one or more of
the four parts of the Complete Auto Transit test. See Washington Rev. Dep't. v. Stevedor-
ing Ass'n, 435 U.S. 734, 750 (Washington business and occupation tax as applied to steve-
doring held not to violate the commerce clause since taxpayers had "proved no facts" to
show failure of the Complete Auto Transit test). Thus, the taxpayer challenging a state tax
provision on this ground must prove that the tax discriminates against interstate commerce.
According to the Court in Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, appellants had the burden of showing
an injurious discrimination against them. 286 U.S. 472, 481 (1932) (held that a state may tax
gasoline bought and imported from another state which is stored by the purchasers for fu-
ture use in their local business).
96. 451 U.S. at 759-60.
97. 468 U.S. at 269.
98. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980) (Ver-
mont's apportioned corporate income tax as it related to dividends from foreign subsidiaries
upheld in part because actual multiple taxation not shown); Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't
of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207, 228 (1980) (Wisconsin apportionment scheme upheld with the
Court noting that "actual multiple taxation has not been shown"). But see J. HELLERSTEIN,
supra note 10, 4.7, at 120. Professor Hellerstein views Mobil Oil Corp. as a case reaffirming
the risk test of multiple taxation. However, this view appears to ignore language in the
Mobil Oil Corp. case and also language in Exxon Corp. suggesting that Mobil Oil Corp.
required that actual multiple burdens be shown. Exxon Corp., 447 U.S. at 228.
99. For a discussion of why the multiple taxation doctrine best fits into the require-
ment of fair apportionment rather than the antidiscrimination requirement, see infra notes
187-214 and accompanying text.
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quired to prove that it actually paid more in taxes than its local
competitors. As the Court explained in Armco, "Appellee suggests
that we should require Armco to prove actual discriminatory im-
pact on it by pointing to a state that imposes a manufacturing tax
that results in a total burden higher than that imposed on Armco's
competitors in West Virginia. This is not the test."100
Because proof of actual competitive injury is not necessary to
hold a statute invalid, the Court has been able to separate the two
issues of constitutionality and remedy. In Bacchus Imports the
Court held that the Hawaiian excise tax on liquors unconstitution-
ally discriminated against interstate commerce, but withheld opin-
ion on the remedies available to appellant liquor wholesalers.101
The Court did not find it necessary to hold that the appellant tax-
payers were entitled to a refund in order to hold that the tax un-
constitutionally discriminated against interstate commerce. 02
D. Identifying Discriminatory State Tax Statutes
1. Facially Discriminatory Statutes
For the taxpayer to meet his burden of proving state tax dis-
crimination, he must show unequal treatment of different groups
of taxpayers. Disparate tax treatment can arise either on the face
100. 467 U.S. at 64.
101. There has been controversy surrounding available remedies to a taxpayer who
proves that a state taxing statute unconstitutionally discriminates against interstate com-
merce. Such a showing may not entitle the taxpayer to a refund of the taxes paid. On the
one hand, it has been argued that only the parties bearing the "economic incidence" of the
tax are constitutionally entitled to a refund of an illegal tax. Thus, if a taxpayer passes a tax
on to its customers, it could not collect a refund. On the other hand, it has been contended
that the commerce clause requires that taxes illegally collected from a taxpayer must be
refunded. See Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 274. In fact, taxpayers frequently have been
unsuccessful in obtaining refunds after a state tax has been declared unconstitutionally dis-
criminatory. See, e.g., American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Conway, No. 85-452 (Vt. Feb. 21,
1986), petition for cert. filled, No. 86-89 (July 21, 1986) (holding that although user license
fees burdening interstate motor carriers were unconstitutionally discriminatory, no refunds
would be granted); Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Secretary of State, No. Ken-85-278 (Me.
Jan. 3, 1986), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1997 (1986) (holding that reciprocal tax on trucks
coming into Maine that are registered in states that levy certain taxes on Maine-registered
trucks was unconstitutionally discriminatory under the commerce clause, but also holding
that taxpayers were not entitled to a refund of taxes paid prior to establishment of a court-
ordered escrow account); Saloria v. Glaser, 93 N.J. 447, 461 A.2d 1100 (1983) (holding that
the New Jersey Emergency Transportation Tax was unconstitutionally discriminatory under
the privileges and immunities clause, but that only prospective relief would be granted);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Ins., 373 N.W.2d 399 (N.D. 1985)
(holding that domestic preference tax on insurance premiums was unconstitutional, but that
only prospective relief would be granted).
102. See Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 273.
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of the tax statute or from the impact of a facially neutral statute.
Legislators with the avowed, or at least intended, purpose of pro-
viding special tax treatment for local business sometimes will enact
a facially discriminatory statute. In these cases, it is not difficult
for the taxpayer to meet its burden of proof. Examples of facially
discriminatory tax provisions are abundant in commerce clause
case law. For instance, Welton v. Missouri'03 involved a license tax
imposed only on itinerant salesmen who sold goods produced
outside the state. In Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Com-
mission'0 4 the challenged provisions taxed the in-state sale of stock
at a lower rate than the out-of-state sale of stock. And Halliburton
Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily 0° involved a tax statute that im-
posed higher taxes on out-of-state manufacturer-users than on in-
state manufacturer-users. 06 These cases were resolved fairly easily
since the enacting state clearly had ignored the commerce clause
premise that no state shall discriminate against interstate
commerce.10
7
2. Facially Neutral Statutes with Discriminatory Effects
The more difficult cases involve facially neutral statutes that
nonetheless have a discriminatory effect on interstate commerce.
Professor Hartman describes these statutes as follows:
While purporting to treat local commerce and interstate commerce alike, if
the practical operation of the tax gives local business a competitive advantage
over interstate business, it will be branded as unconstitutionally discrimina-
tory. In short, a tax may be nondiscriminatory on the face, but the effect may
be discriminatory. The Court has frequently found it necessary to probe be-
neath the face of the statute to expose its discriminatory nature and effect.'" s
A series of cases involving itinerant salesmen demonstrates
how a facially neutral statute can be discriminatory. In Robbins v.
Shelby County Taxing District'09 a drummers license tax imposed
on all salesmen selling by sample who did not have a licensed place
of business in the taxing district was held invalid. Even though the
language of the statute applied equally to domestic and foreign
103. 91 U.S. 275 (1876).
104. 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
105. 373 U.S. 64 (1963).
106. See also Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. 263 (excise tax imposed on sales of liquor at
wholesale exempted locally produced beverages); Armco, 467 U.S. 638 (gross receipts tax on
businesses selling tangible property at wholesale exempted local producers).
107. See Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 125,
131.
108. P. HARTMAN, supra note 17, § 2:19, at 123.
109. 120 U.S. 489 (1877).
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drummers, the Court recognized that the practical effect of the
statute would be to burden foreign merchandisers more heavily be-
cause domestic merchandisers generally have an established place
of business in the state.110 Likewise, in Best Co. v. Maxwell"' the
Court invalidated an annual privilege tax of 250 dollars on sales-
men displaying samples who were not regular retail merchants in
the state. Nominally, the statute taxed all itinerant salesmen
whether resident or nonresident. The practical effect of the stat-
ute, however, was to discriminate against foreign salesmen who
normally would not be considered regular retail merchants in the
state. According to the Court, "[T]he commerce clause forbids dis-
crimination, whether forthright or ingenious. In each case it is our
duty to determine whether the statute under attack, whatever its
name may be, will in its practical operation work discrimination
against interstate commerce."112 In Nippert v. Richmond," 3 more-
over, an annual license tax imposed on all persons "engaged in
business as solicitors" was held unconstitutional. Analyzing the
practical effect of the tax, the Court concluded that it would more
heavily burden foreign solicitors in part because of the risk of mul-
tiple taxation by various localities in which the itinerant salesman
offered his goods for sale. According to the Court,
It is no answer. . . that the tax is neither prohibitive nor discriminatory
on the face of the ordinance; or that it applies to all local distributors doing
business as appellant has done. Not the tax in a vacuum of words, but its
practical consequences for the doing of interstate commerce in applications to
concrete facts are our concern. To ignore the variations in effect which follow
from application of the tax, uniform on the face of the ordinance, to highly
different fact situations is only to ignore those practical consequences." 4
3. Legislative History
A facially neutral statute may be revealed as discriminatory
through examination of its legislative history. Statements in the
legislative history of a statute relating to its purpose may indicate
that a facially neutral statute was enacted to benefit local com-
merce. For example, in Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully" 5 the
legislative history showed that the DISC export credit was in-
tended to be a "tax advantage" that "would increase as the sales
110. Id. at 498.
111. 311 U.S. 454 (1940).
112. Id. at 455-56 (footnote omitted).
113. 327 U.S. 416 (1946).
114. Id. at 431 (footnote omitted).
115. 466 U.S. 388 (1984).
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. .. of products from New York sources increases-a situation
that provides an incentive to remain and possibly expand business
in this state."
'"16
The legislative history also may contain less obvious indicators
of a discriminatory purpose than outright statements of an intent
to benefit local business. For example, Colorado originally enacted
a five cent reduction in its gasoline tax for gasohol manufactured
in-state. 1 7 After the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a similar
Minnesota statute violated the commerce clause,"18 Colorado al-
tered its gasoline tax reduction provision."19 Under the new provi-
sion the reduction was granted to gasohol "produced from no more
than three million gallons of alcohol annually from each facility
having a design production capacity of seventeen million gallons or
less per year of such alcohol."'' 20 The effect of this new provision
was the same as the old provision since only out-of-state gasohol
producers were large enough to be adversely affected by the newly
enacted production capacity limitation. It would appear, then, that
the Colorado legislature simply found a clever way to retain the
tax reduction for in-state producers.' 2 ' The new statute was chal-
lenged on equal protection and commerce clause grounds, but was
held valid by the Colorado Supreme Court. 22 It appears, however,
that the statute does discriminate against interstate commerce. Al-
though the new statute is facially neutral, its effect is discrimina-
tory, and its legislative history suggests that it was enacted for dis-
criminatory purposes.'
23
Although a legislative statement of discriminatory purpose is
somewhat superfluous when a statute is facially discriminatory, the
courts often cite legislative history when holding these statutes un-
constitutional. For example, in Boston Stock Exchange the Court
116. New York State Department of Commerce, Memorandum Recommending Ap-
proval of Assembly Bill A-12108-A (May 24, 1972), reprinted in Bill Jacket of 1982 N.Y.
Laws ch 778, at 9.11.
117. 1978 Colo. Sess. Laws 516, quoted in Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. State, 690
P.2d 177 (Colo. 1984). For a description of the chain of events leading to Colorado's gasoline
tax reduction, see J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION 4.12[4A][c], at S28
(1985 Supp.) [hereinafter cited as J. HELLERSTEIN, 1985 SUPPLEMENT].
118. See Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. State, 315 N.W.2d 597 (Minn. 1982).
119. See J. HELLERSTEIN, 1985 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 117, 4.12[4A] [c], at S28.
120. COLo. REv. STAT. § 39-27-102(1)(a)(II) (1982).
121. See J. HELLERSTEIN, 1985 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 117, % 4.12[4A][c], at S28.
122. See Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. State, 690 P.2d 177 (Colo. 1984).
123. See J. HELLERSTEIN, 1985 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 117, 1 4.12[4A][c], at S29.
Moreover, Professor Hellerstein indicates that the statute is inconsistent with the recent
Supreme Court decision in Bacchus Imports, in which the Court held that a state cannot
prefer its own products over out-of-state goods. Id. at S30.
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made a point of stating that the legislative history of the chal-
lenged New York statute indicated that its purpose was "'to en-
courage the effecting by nonresidents of the state of New York of
their sales within the State of New York and the retention within
the state of New York of sales involving large blocks of stock.' "124
Similarly, in Bacchus Imports the Court noted that the legislative
history of the Hawaiian excise tax indicated that the tax was
designed "'to help' in stimulating 'the local fruit wine
industry.' "125
If a statute is discriminatory either on its face or in its effect, a
statement in the legislative history that the statute was intended
for nondiscriminatory purposes should not save the statute from
being found unconstitutional. Thus, in City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey126 a New Jersey statute prohibiting the importation of
waste material into the state was held unconstitutionally discrimi-
natory even though the legislature cited environmental protection
as the statute's purpose. As the Court explained:
[T]he evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as leg-
islative ends.. . . [W]hatever New Jersey's ultimate purpose, it may not be
accomplished by discriminating against articles of commerce coming from
outside the State unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat
them differently. Both on its face and in its plain effect, [the statute] violates
this principle of nondiscrimination.
127
E. Statutory Mechanisms Used to Create Disparate Tax
Treatment
Disparate tax treatment in which one group of taxpayers is
subjected to a heavier tax burden than another group can be ef-
fected through various statutory mechanisms. One of the more ob-
vious methods of discriminating is to tax one group of individuals
or enterprises and not another. To discriminate in this manner, a
tax can be narrowly aimed at one group of taxpayers. For example,
in Welton v. Missouri 12 the Court struck down as discriminatory a
license tax imposed only on itinerant salesmen who sold goods pro-
duced outside the state. Alternatively, a tax statute can be focused
broadly, but provide exemptions for certain taxpayers. Bacchus
Imports involved an excise tax that was imposed on sales of liquor
124. 429 U.S. at 318 (quoting 1968 N.Y. Laws 827, § 1).
125. 468 U.S. at 270-71 (quoting In re Bacchus Imports, Ltd., 65 Hawaii 566, 574, 656
P.2d 724, 730 (1982)).
126. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
127. Id. at 626-27.
128. 91 U.S. 275 (1876).
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at wholesale, but that exempted from the tax sales of certain lo-
cally produced beverages. 129 Similarly, in Armco v. Hardesty the
Court found discriminatory a gross receipts tax on businesses sell-
ing tangible property at wholesale that exempted local
manufacturers. 130
States also can create disparate tax treatment between groups
by differentiating various elements used to compute the groups'
tax liabilities. Accordingly, the tax rates applied to different groups
can be varied. Boston Stock Exchange, for instance, involved tax
provisions that reduced by fifty percent the rate of transfer tax on
securities transactions when a nonresident conducted the transac-
tion within the state.3 1 Disparity also can be created in the tax-
payers' tax bases. In Halliburton the Court held that a use tax was
discriminatory because the tax base included the cost of labor and
shop overhead only when equipment was assembled out-of-state.
1 32
Tax discrimination also can be effected through use of credits,
limitations, or special deductions for the favored group. For in-
stance, in Maryland v. Louisiana the Court held discriminatory a
tax imposed on the first use of outer continental shelf natural gas
brought into Louisiana because the tax was allowed as a credit
against other Louisiana taxes so that in-state consumers of the
outer continental shelf gas generally were not burdened by the
tax.133 In Boston Stock Exchange the Court found that disparate
tax treatment resulted from a special limitation favoring intrastate
commerce. In that case the total transfer tax on securities transac-
tions involving an in-state sale was limited to 350 dollars for a sin-
gle transaction, whereas no such limitation was provided for out-
of-state transactions. 3 4 In Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully
135
the Court found unconstitutional discrimination when a franchise
tax credit was based on gross receipts from products shipped from
a regular place of business within the state. The Court pointed out
that discrimination is unconstitutional regardless of the kind of
taxing mechanism used to create the disparate treatment. Accord-
ing to the Westinghouse Court, it is not "relevant that New York
discriminates against business carried on outside the State by dis-
allowing a tax credit rather than by imposing a higher tax. The
129. 468 U.S. at 263.
130. 467 U.S. at 638.
131. 429 U.S. at 318.
132. 373 U.S. at 63.
133. 451 U.S. at 725 (1981).
134. 429 U.S. at 318.
135. 466 U.S. 388 (1984).
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1. The Concept of Complementary Taxes
Although a tax statute results in disparate tax treatment of
different groups of taxpayers, the statute still may not be consid-
ered discriminatory if other related taxes equalize the tax burdens.
The concept of compensating or complementary taxes that can
save a particular tax statute from being deemed unconstitutional is
embedded firmly in commerce clause theory. 37 In 1928 the Su-
preme Court held in Interstate Bus Corp. v. Blodgett 3 8 that a
mileage tax imposed on buses used in interstate commerce was not
repugnant to the commerce clause, in part because buses used in
intrastate commerce were subjected to a gross receipts tax. The
Court explained the complementary tax doctrine as follows:
The two statutes are complementary in the sense that while both levy a
tax on those engaged in carrying passengers for hire over state highways in
motor vehicles, to be expended for highway maintenance, one affects only
interstate and the other only intrastate commerce. Appellant plainly does not
establish discrimination by showing merely that the two statutes are different
136. Id. at 389-90.
137. Concepts analogous to the commerce clause doctrine of complementary taxes also
are applied in analysis of other constitutional provisions prohibiting discrimination such as
the equal protection clause, the privileges and immunities clause, the first amendment, and
the supremacy clause. Often the courts will consider the effect of other tax provisions in
determining whether a particular tax statute is unconstitutionally discriminatory. See, e.g.,
Williams v. Vermont, 105 S. Ct. 2465 (1985) (in holding that a Vermont statute imposing a
use tax on cars registered in Vermont may be unconstitutionally discriminatory under the
equal protection clause, the Court noted that the use tax in this instance did not comple-
ment the state's sales tax); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue,
460 U.S. 575 (1983) (in holding that a use tax imposed on paper and ink products used by
certain newspapers imposed an unfair burden on interests protected by the first amend-
ment, the Court pointed out that there was no constitutionally valid reason for substituting
the use tax for the generally applicable sales tax); Washington v. United States, 460 U.S.
536 (1983) (in holding that a sales tax imposed on contractors involved in construction
projects on federally owned land, but not imposed on contractors for nonfederal projects,
did not violate the nondiscrimination principle of the supremacy clause, the Court explained
that due to a sales tax imposed on the landowners of nonfederal projects, there was no
discriminatory economic burden on the United States); Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S.
656 (1975) (in holding that a New Hampshire commuters income tax imposed on nonresi-
dents' New Hampshire-derived income violated the privileges and immunities clause, the
Court refused to agree with the state's contention that there was no discrimination against
nonresidents due to offsetting tax credits allowed by neighboring states). For a discussion of
these other restraints on state tax discrimination, see infra notes 319-54, 371-92 and accom-
panying text.
138. 276 U.S. 245 (1928).
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in form or adopt a different measure or method of assessment, or that it is
subject to three kinds of taxes while intrastate carriers are subject only to two
or to one. 39
Similarly, in Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query40 a state statute im-
posing a tax on gasoline imported into the state and stored for fu-
ture use or consumption withstood commerce clause attack be-
cause the state enacted complementary tax statutes imposing
equivalent excise taxes on the sale and use of gasoline in the state.
Responding to the contention that the constitutionality of a stat-
ute must be determined "within its four corners," the Court stated:
The question of constitutional validity is not to be determined by artifi-
cial standards. What is required is that state action, whether through one
agency or another, or through one enactment or more than one, shall be con-
sistent with the restrictions of the Federal Constitution. There is no demand
in the Constitution that the State shall put its requirements in any one stat-
ute. It may distribute them as it sees fit, if the result, taken in its totality, is
within the State's constitutional power.
1 4
1
The classic case of compensating taxes involves the interrela-
tionship of retail sales and use taxes. Use taxes specifically are
designed to prevent sales tax avoidance by taxpayers buying prop-
erty outside the state. 142 A use tax imposed on the privilege of us-
ing property within the state prevents sales tax avoidance because
the taxpayer buying outside the state is taxed when the property is
brought into the state for use. In Henneford v. Silas Mason Co.'
43
the Supreme Court upheld the validity of a use tax against com-
merce clause challenge. The taxpayer argued that the use tax was
discriminatory because it effectively applied only to goods pur-
chased outside the state since in-state purchases were subjected to
sales tax and thus were exempted from use tax. Viewing the inter-
action of the state's use tax with its sales tax, however, the Court
found no discrimination. According to the Court,
When the account is made up, the stranger from afar is subject to no
greater burdens as a consequence of ownership than the dweller within the
gates. The one pays upon one activity or incident, and the other upon an-
139. Id. at 251. See also American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, No. 11 M.D. 1985
(Pa. May 6, 1986) (holding that marker fee and axle tax burdening only foreign registered
trucks were not discriminatory due to the compensating registration fee imposed on domes-
tic registered trucks). But see American Trucking Ass'ns., Inc. v. Conway, No. 85-452 (Vt.
Feb. 21, 1986) (holding user fees burdening foreign registered trucks discriminatory despite
existence of higher registration fees for domestically registered trucks).
140. 286 U.S. 472 (1932).
141. Id. at 479-80.
142. See W. Hellerstein, State Taxation in the Federal System: Perspectives on Loui-
siana's First Use Tax on Natural Gas, 55 TUL. L. REv. 601, 621 (1981).
143. 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
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other, but the sum is the same when the reckoning is closed. Equality exists
when the chattel subjected to the use tax is bought in another state and then
carried into [the state]. It exists when the imported chattel is shipped from
the state of origin under an order received directly from the state of destina-
tion. In each situation the burden borne by the owner is balanced by an equal
burden where the sale is strictly local.
1 4
4
2. The Court's Method of Recognizing Complementary Taxes
Although it is firmly established that designation as a compen-
sating tax can prevent a state tax statute from being deemed dis-
criminatory under the commerce clause, the definition of "compen-
sating tax" is not clearly established. As Professor Hartman has
pointed out, "[A] 'bright-line' test is not easily discernible from a
number of decisions where the Court inquired whether the alleged
compensating tax did properly serve as a balm of Gilead to heal an
otherwise discriminatorily ill tax.' 14 5
Some of the older Supreme Court decisions appear to go fur-
ther afield in search of compensating taxes than more recent deci-
sions. Older decisions considered different types of taxes on unre-
lated activities to be complementary. In Interstate Bus Corp. v.
Blodgett146 a gross receipts tax and a mileage tax were viewed as
complementary; in Hinson v. Lott147 a tax on bringing liquor into
the state for sale and a tax on manufacturing liquor were held to
be complementary. 148 In more recent decisions the Court has
demonstrated a reluctance to consider taxes on unrelated activities
to be complementary. For example, in Maryland v. Louisiana a
tax on the first use of natural gas brought into the state and not
previously taxed by another jurisdiction was not considered to be a
compensating tax for the state's severance tax on natural gas; 49 in
Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty a wholesale gross receipts tax was not con-
sidered a compensating tax for a manufacturing tax.150
It is difficult to understand just how the Court identifies com-
plementary taxes. For instance, in Alaska v. Arctic Maid 5' the
Court upheld a tax on freezer ships obtaining fish for freezing, in
144. Id. at 584.
145. P. HARTMAN, 1985 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 9, § 2:19, at 23.
146. 276 U.S. at 245.
147. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 148 (1868).
148. See also General Am. Tank Car Corp. v. Day, 270 U.S. 367 (1926) (special tax on
rolling stock of nonresidents in lieu of general property tax on residents held non-
discriminatory).
149. 451 U.S. at 725.
150. 467 U.S. at 638.
151. 366 U.S. 199 (1961).
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part because local canners were subjected to even higher taxes.
The Court focused on identifying the competitors of the freezer
ships, which were deemed to be the Alaskan canners and not those
who freeze fish for the local retail market. Local fish processors
selling to the consumer market were subjected to a lower tax than
the freezer ships, but the canners were subjected to a higher tax
than the freezer ships.152
The Arctic Maid rationale suggests that it is crucial to assess
competitive effects in determining whether two taxes are comple-
mentary. More recently, however, the Court has not focused on
identifying competitors. Instead, in its most recent pronounce-
ments on the subject, the Court indicated that taxes must be lev-
ied on "substantially equivalent events" for them to be considered
complementary. 153  In Armco the Court concluded,
"[M]anufacturing and wholesaling are not 'substantially equivalent
events' such that the heavy tax on in-state manufacturers can be
said to compensate for the admittedly lighter burden placed on
wholesalers from out of state.' 1 54 Elaborating on this conclusion,
the Court focused on the mechanics of the manufacturing tax,
pointing out that the tax did not operate as "a proxy" for the gross
receipts tax imposed on out-of-state wholesalers. As the Court ex-
plained, the taxes were not equivalent since the manufacturing tax
was not reduced when an in-state manufacturer sold its goods out-
of-state, but was reduced when part of the manufacturing took
place out-of-state. 155 Moreover, the Court suggested that the taxes
were not compensatory because they were not "internally consis-
tent.'1 56 Hence, if another state had imposed a manufacturer's
gross receipts tax, no provision was made to reduce the West Vir-
ginia liability.
Likewise, in Maryland v. Louisiana the Louisiana first use tax
could not be justified as compensating for the effect of the state's
severance tax on local production since the two events were not
considered to be substantially equivalent.157 According to the
Court, "[T]he common thread running through the cases uphold-
ing compensatory taxes is the equality of treatment between local
and interstate commerce.' 58 In an attempt further to illuminate
152. Id. at 204.
153. See Armco, 467 U.S. at 640; Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. at 758-59.
154. 468 U.S. at 642.
155. Id. at 642.
156. Id. at 642-43.
157. 451 U.S. at 758-59.
158. Id. at 759.
[Vol. 39:879
STATE TAX DISCRIMINATION
the compensatory tax issue, the Court pointed out, "[T]he concept
of a compensatory tax first requires identification of the burden for
which the State is attempting to compensate." 159 The severance
tax was viewed as compensating the state for the depletion of its
natural resources. The first use tax, however, was not designed for
the same purpose since it was levied on natural gas taken from the
outer continental shelf, and the state had no right to be compen-
sated for these federally owned resources.160 Again, as in Armco,
the Court in Maryland v. Louisiana considered the operation and
interaction of the two taxes, noting that "the pattern of credits and
exemptions allowed under the Louisiana statute undeniably violate
[the] principle of equality."''
Unfortunately, the "substantially equivalent events" test
sheds very little light on the problem of identifying compensatory
taxes. As Professor Hartman has pointed out, "[T]he phrase 'sub-
stantially equivalent events' used by Armco as the touchstone for
determining the complementary nature of two or more taxes ap-
pears to be something of an accordion term that can be expanded
or contracted as the Court thinks the situation warrants."' 62 In
fact, analysis of the Armco and Maryland v. Louisiana cases sug-
gests that the Court's enunciation of a test based solely on compar-
ison of events is misleading. The Court in these two cases appears
to have focused not only on the equivalence of events, but also on
other factors relating to the operation and interaction of the two
taxes. Thus, it is unclear just how the Court now decides whether
two taxes are complementary.
The confusion remaining in the area of complementary taxes
is perhaps best exemplified by a recent decision of the Supreme
Court of Washington. In National Can Corp. v. Washington'63 the
Washington Supreme Court held that the state's business and oc-
cupation tax provision, which exempts from the manufacturing tax
local wholesalers who are taxed under the wholesaling provisions,
does not discriminate against interstate commerce. Despite the
Court's Armco holding that manufacturing and wholesaling are not
substantially equivalent events, the Washington Supreme Court
held that the Washington wholesaling and manufacturing tax pro-
visions were complementary:16 4
159. Id. at 758.
160. Id. at 759.
161. Id.
162. P. HARTMAN, 1985 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 9, § 2:19, at 30.
163. 105 Wash. 2d 327, 715 P.2d 128, cert. granted (U.S. Oct. 6, 1986)(No. 85-2006).
164. Id. at 328, 715 P.2d at 131. The court distinguished the West Virginia provisions
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The incongruities between Taxpayers' reading of Armco and earlier, well-es-
tablished commerce clause cases makes us reluctant to extend Armco as Tax-
payers urge. There is a disturbing formalism in their argument that manufac-
turing and wholesaling are never "substantially equivalent events." To read
Armco thusly would foreclose analyzing a taxpayer's burden in light of both
the structure of the relevant tax system and its effect on a single economic
unit.
1 6 5
There is, then, a need for the Court to clarify what factors it
will consider in determining whether two taxes are complementary.
State legislators need to know the scope of the compensating tax
doctrine to fashion complementary taxes that do not violate the
commerce clause. Taxpayers and their advisors also need to know
when courts will consider taxes to be complementary to determine
whether a tax should be challenged under the commerce clause.
Uncertainty deters taxpayers from challenging the constitutional-
ity of taxes. To the extent unfairness in the taxing system is per-
ceived, voluntary compliance suffers.
3. Principles for Determining Whether Taxes Are
Complementary
Two principles generally are agreed upon by those attempting
to delineate the scope of the complementary tax doctrine. First,
only one state's tax laws should be considered in determining the
existence of a compensatory tax.16 Thus, courts will not look to
more than one state's taxes when weighing the relative tax burdens
of the intrastate and interstate taxpayers. Second, to be comple-
mentary the two taxes should impose roughly equivalent economic
burdens167 or at least not impose a greater burden on interstate
held unconstitutional in Armco, in part, by emphasizing that the West Virginia rates on
manufacturing and wholesaling were substantially different, whereas the Washington rates
on the two activities were "substantially identical." Id. at 330, 715 P.2d at 133. This distinc-
tion appears unwarranted since the disparity in the West Virginia tax rates in fact weighed
in favor of the out-of-state interests. Thus, the rates in Armco would appear to be irrelevant
to the determination that the two tax provisions were not complementary.
165. Id. at 331-32, 715 P.2d at 134 (citations omitted).
166. Cf. Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975) (holding that income tax on
nonresidents violated the privileges and immunities clause because residents were not taxed
on out-of-state income and tax credits of neighboring states could not cure the disparate tax
treatment); Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60 (1920) (holding that privileges
and immunities clause prohibited disparate income taxation of residents and nonresidents
in the taxing state despite argument that similar taxing schemes enacted by neighboring
states would remove the disparate tax treatment).
167. Although generally equivalence of economic burdens means dollars equivalence of
disparate taxes, in certain instances dollar equivalence of disparate taxes may not result in
the same economic burden or there may be equivalence of economic burdens without dollar
equivalence. See W. Hellerstein, Complementary Taxes as a Defense to Unconstitutional
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taxpayers. 168 Sales and use taxes, for example, are considered com-
plementary only if they do not result in higher taxes on the out-of-
state purchase than on the in-state purchase.
169
Beyond these two general principles, further limitations on the
scope of the complementary tax doctrine are needed, but are diffi-
cult to construct. Professor Jerome Hellerstein advocates clarifying
the scope of compensatory taxes by use of a single-factor test that
focuses on the transactions being taxed. Professor Hellerstein
would require that for taxes to be compensatory, they must be lev-
ied on the same transaction.170 Professor Hellerstein points out
that Congress enacted such a limitation in 1976 legislation prohib-
iting state tax discrimination against out-of-state manufacturers,
producers, wholesalers, retailers, or consumers of electricity.17 1 The
applicable state taxes were limited to those "on or with respect to
the generation or transmission of electricity.' ' 72 According to Pro-
fessor Hellerstein, a transaction based limitation is needed because
"[i]mplementation of a rule of law that a tax is nondiscriminatory
because other taxes of at least the same magnitude are imposed by
the taxing State on other taxpayers engaging in different transac-
tions would plunge the Court into the morass of weighing compar-
ative tax burdens.'
73
At least from a superficial viewpoint, the "same transaction"
test would seem to be not so far removed from the Court's "sub-
stantially equivalent events" language. It would appear at first
glance that determining whether taxes are imposed on "substan-
tially equivalent events" or on the "same transaction" would both
require merely a pinpointing of the subjects of taxation. The same
transaction test simply would require closer identity between the
subjects of taxation. There is, however, a problem with relying ex-
clusively on the identity of transactions subject to tax to define
State Tax Discrimination, 39 TAx LAw. 405, 435-36, 463 (1986).
168. As Professor Walter Hellerstein has remarked, however, the Court on several oc-
casions has paid only "lip service" to the concept that taxes imposed on interstate transpor-
tation and communication businesses in lieu of property taxes must be the equivalent of the
local property taxes in order to be constitutional. Id. The Court has sustained taxes that are
greater than the property taxes that could have been imposed on the taxpayer. See Railway
Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1958).
169. See, e.g., Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64 (1963) (sales
and use taxes held not complementary because use tax base larger than sales tax base).
170. See J. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 10, 1 4.12[5], at 150-51. See also W. Hellerstein,
supra note 167, at 460 (complementary tax doctrine should not be extended to taxes on
different business activities or transaction).
171. Id.
172. Tax Reform Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 391 (1982).
173. J. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 10, T 4.12[5], at 150.
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complementary taxes. It is universally agreed that sales and use
taxes are complementary to each other. Yet, under Professor Hel-
lerstein's "same transaction" test it is difficult to reach this conclu-
sion. The sales tax is imposed on the retail transaction, whereas
the use tax is imposed on the use of property. As the Court
pointed out in McLeod v. Dilworth Co., 17 4 sales and use taxes "are
assessments upon different transactions. ' 175 Professor Hellerstein
contends, "The Court can readily take into account the interrela-
tions of such levies as sales and use taxes growing out of the same
purchase and sale."'1 6 Professor Hellerstein, however, provides no
explanation of when such interrelations are to be taken into ac-
count. In particular, it is difficult under the "same transaction"
test to distinguish a complementary sales and use tax statute from
the severance tax and first use tax at issue in Maryland v. Louisi-
ana. Focusing on the transactions being taxed, severance and first
use could appear to be related in the same manner as sales and
use.17
7
Perhaps sales and use taxes should be considered complemen-
tary not because they are imposed on the same transaction, but
rather because they both are designed as taxes on consumption.
Instead of requiring that the transactions subject to tax be identi-
cal, a finding of compensatory taxes should depend on whether
both statutes target the same economic activity for the burden of
taxation. As the Court stated in Maryland v. Louisiana, "The con-
cept of a compensatory tax first requires identification of the bur-
den for which the state is attempting to compensate. 17 8 The typi-
cal sales and use taxing statutes thus would be deemed
compensatory because both taxes are aimed at taxing consump-
tion. The fact that a taxpayer generally is given a credit against his
use tax liability for any sales taxes paid in other states underlines
the focus on taxing all consumption equally.
On the other hand, the severance and first use taxes in Mary-
land v. Louisiana did not burden a common economic process. Un-
174. 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
175. Id. at 330.
176. J. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 10, 4.12[5], at 150.
177. See W. Hellerstein, supra note 142, at 620-24. Professor Walter Hellerstein has
suggested that the "surface discrimination" embodied in Louisiana's first use tax may disap-
pear when it is read in conjunction with the severance tax in a manner analogous to sales
and use taxes. Professor Hellerstein argues, however, that the manner in which the sever-
ance tax and first use tax operate and interact reveals underlying discriminatory features in
the Louisiana taxing scheme. Id.
178. 451 U.S. at 758.
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like the typical sales and use taxes' focus on consumption, deple-
tion of natural resources does not appear to be the shared target of
the two taxes. Under the Louisiana scheme a credit was given
against the severance tax for first use taxes paid.17 9 This credit
mechanism undermines a scheme of equally taxing depletion of
natural resources and instead provides a tax benefit for certain de-
pletion of these resources within the state. According to one com-
mentator, "[T]he grant of a severance tax credit for First Use
Taxes paid effectively removes the burden of the First Use Tax
from gas extracted offshore to the extent of severance tax liabil-
ity. . . .[Hence,] an incentive is provided for First Use Taxpayers
to undertake mineral extraction activities in Louisiana so as to
minimize their effective First Use Tax burden." 180 Moreover, other
provisions of the first use tax exempted from taxation outer conti-
nental shelf gas consumed in Louisiana for certain purposes.1 81
Clearly, the two taxes did not have the common objective of taxing
the consumption of natural resources. In fact, the interaction of
the two taxes runs against a shared goal of taxing the consumption
of natural resources. Rather than subjecting the same economic ac-
tivity (depletion of natural resources) to the same burden of taxa-
tion, Louisiana rewarded taxpayers for depleting in-state natural
resources to the extent they paid first use tax on the depletion of
outer continental shelf resources. Consequently, it seems quite
clear that the two taxing statutes, when read together, were not
aimed at taxing the same economic process, namely, the depletion
of natural resources.
Focusing on the underlying economic activity that the taxing
statutes are designed to burden is preferable to focusing on the
particular transaction that triggers the tax. Although a test that
looks to the identity of transactions being taxed has the advantage
of ease of administration and predictability, it is not based on the
relevant criteria and hence may be unfair. Frequently, the selec-
tion of a transaction or event on which to levy a tax is merely a
matter of administrative convenience. For example, the retail
transaction on which a sales tax is levied merely represents a con-
venient point to measure consumption.
To maintain fairness along with some degree of predictability
and ease of administration in the complementary tax doctrine, sev-
eral factors should be considered in determining whether two taxes
179. See id. at 756.
180. W. Hellerstein, supra note 142, at 623-24.
181. See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. at 756.
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burden the same economic activity. First, and perhaps foremost,
the taxes should be imposed on related events, for example, the
same stage in the economic process. Although taxation of the same
transaction may not be necessary, there must be an underlying
connection between the transactions subject to tax so that imposi-
tion of a tax on them represents a burden on the same economic
activity. In this regard, the Court's "substantially equivalent
event" test could be given real meaning. Events would be substan-
tially equivalent only if they represented taxation of the same eco-
nomic activity. For instance, taxes on manufacturing and wholesal-
ing generally would not be considered compensatory because they
are not imposed on related events.
182
The equivalence of events being taxed, however, should not
end the analysis of whether taxes are compensatory. Other factors
may demonstrate that two taxes burden the same economic activ-
ity in such a manner as to be compensatory. For instance, the op-
eration and interaction of the two taxes should be considered. In
particular, any offsetting credits must be analyzed to determine
whether the two taxes operate in conjunction with each other to
burden the same economic activity. Thus, in Maryland v. Louisi-
ana it was the credit provisions that revealed that the two taxes
were not in fact compensatory. 18 3 Likewise, in Armco the Court
suggested that certain reductions in the manufacturing tax would
have indicated that it was a "proxy" for the gross receipts tax.
184
The consequences of all states' enacting provisions similar to
those of the taxing state should also be considered in determining
whether the taxing provisions are complementary. As the Court
pointed out in Armco, complementary taxes should be internally
consistent. If the two taxes are designed to burden the same eco-
nomic activity equally, whether the activity is conducted within or
without the taxing state, then equal burdens on intrastate and in-
terstate commerce should result when all states enact the same
taxing scheme. 185
182. Unless the state enacted certain credits or deductions which resulted in a tax on
wholesaling being equivalent to a tax on manufacturing, taxes on these two activities would
not appear to be complementary. Thus, under this analysis, the recent decision of the Wash-
ington Supreme Court in National Can Corp. v. Washington, 105 Wash. 2d 327, 715 P.2d
128, cert. granted (U.S. Oct. 6, 1986)(No. 85-2006), which held that the Washington manu-
facturing and wholesaling tax provisions were complementary, would appear to be incorrect.
183. See 451 U.S. at 759.
184. 467 U.S. at 643.
185. Id. at 644. But see National Can Corp., 105 Wash. 2d at 327, 715 P.2d at 128.
According to the Washington Supreme Court, Armco does not require that the internal con-
sistency requirement be applied to determine discrimination.
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Legislative intent may be relevant in determining whether
taxes are complementary. If the legislature expressly designs two
taxes to burden the same economic activity, it may be easier for
the court to reach the conclusion that in fact the two taxes are
compensatory. In this regard, statements in the statute's legislative
history sometimes reveal legislative intent. Even without an ex-
press statement of intent, however, it may be possible to surmise
why a particular statute was enacted as formulated. For instance,
constitutional limitations influence the manner in which the state
legislature imposes burdens on interstate commerce. Because a
state cannot constitutionally tax out-of-state sales, to equalize the
tax burdens of residents buying tangible personal property in-state
and those buying out-of-state, the state complements its sales tax
with a use tax.
IV. THE CAUSE OF THE INEQUALITY
Once a court determines that disparate tax treatment exists, it
must determine that the inequality is a result of the state tax stat-
ute being challenged. Generally, a statute will not be invalidated
unless it is shown to be the cause of a prohibited result.-8 This
section examines the causation element of a discrimination claim
and discusses whether multiple tax burdens are unconstitutionally
discriminatory. In addition, this section reviews to what extent, if
any, the nondiscriminatory prong of the Complete Auto Transit
test should apply when a state's apportionment formula is chal-
lenged on commerce clause grounds.
A. Multiple Burden of Taxation Doctrine and State Tax
Discrimination
It is unclear whether a state tax statute that imposes a possi-
bility or risk of multiple taxation on interstate commerce is uncon-
stitutionally discriminatory. Traditionally, under the multiple bur-
den of taxation doctrine, a statute that threatened interstate
commerce with cumulative tax burdens not borne by local business
was unconstitutional under the commerce clause. Nearly fifty years
ago, in developing the multiple burden of taxation doctrine, Justice
186. See L. TRIE, supra note 3, § 3-21, at 92. Professor Tribe explains causation as a
corollary to the injury in fact requirement, which must be shown for a litigant to have
standing to challenge a statute. Id. As Professor Tribe explains, it is necessary that "a liti-
gant show that the challenged government action caused the litigant's injury." Id. Thus, the
challenged state tax statute must be responsible for the disparate tax treatment in order for
a court to find it unconstitutional as discriminating against interstate commerce.
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Stone stated:
The vice characteristic of those [taxes] which have been held invalid is that
they have placed on the commerce burdens of such a nature as to be capable,
in point of substance of being imposed or added to with equal right by every
state which the commerce touches, merely because interstate commerce is be-
ing done, so that without the protection of the commerce clause it would bear
cumulative burdens not imposed on local commerce. 187
A number of taxes subsequently were invalidated under the multi-
ple burden of taxation doctrine.188 The Supreme Court temporarily
abandoned the multiple burdens doctrine, but then revived it in
the late 1950s.1 19
Although the contemporary approach to commerce clause
analysis enunciated in Complete Auto Transit does not explicitly
refer to multiple burdens of taxation, the four-prong test implicitly
may incorporate the multiple burden doctrine. Clearly, the re-
quirement that a state tax be fairly apportioned to the taxpayer's
activity within the state prevents a certain degree of multiple taxa-
tion.1 90 Arguably, the requirement that state taxes not discriminate
against interstate commerce also prohibits certain multiple bur-
dens. There is disparate tax treatment when commerce crossing
state lines is subjected to multiple taxation that is not imposed on
purely local business. According to Professor Jerome Hellerstein,
The multiple taxation doctrine . . . is designed to prevent interstate com-
merce from being put in a disadvantageous position vis-a-vis intrastate com-
merce, because of the power of the States, aside from the Commerce Clause,
to subject interstate enterprises to cumulative tax burdens not borne by local
business. Hence, like taxes that on their face discriminate against interstate
businesses, taxes that subject interstate business to a risk of multiple taxa-
tion to which intrastate business is not subjected, may be subsumed under
187. Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 255-56 (1938) (citations
omitted).
188. See, e.g., Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939) (state tax
imposed on total gross receipts of marketing agency making sales in-state and out-of-state
held invalid since other states could impose a tax similarly measured on the taxpayer's gross
receipts); Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 311 (1938) (Indiana gross receipts tax
imposed directly on an in-state manufacturer shipping orders out of state held invalid since
"the exaction is of such a character that if lawful it may in substance be laid to the fullest
extent by States in which the goods are sold as well as those in which they are
manufactured").
189. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946), marked a temporary reversion to the di-
rect versus indirect burden test of constitutionality under the commerce clause. This back-
ward step in commerce clause adjudication was renounced when the Court revived the mul-
tiple burden doctrine. See Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S.
450, 463 (1959) (holding that income tax imposed on out-of-state corporation's income ap-
portioned to business activities within the taxing state did not violate the commerce clause
in part because there was "nothing to show that multiple taxation is present").
190. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 442-47 (1979).
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the prohibition of taxes that discriminate against interstate commerce. 191
Intuitively, there is some logic in equating the multiple burden
test with the prohibition against discriminatory state taxes. Prior
to Complete Auto Transit, the chief role of the commerce clause in
state taxation was to prohibit multiple tax burdens. After this
landmark decision, the prohibition against discrimination is viewed
as the primary contribution of the commerce clause to the state
tax field. 192 Moreover, the Supreme Court has made a passing ref-
erence that multiple burdens are discriminatory. In Northwestern
States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota19" the Court asserted:
"Nor may a State impose a tax which discriminates against inter-
state commerce either by providing a direct commercial advantage
to local business, or by subjecting commerce to the burden of 'mul-
tiple taxation.' ,,194
Incorporating the multiple burden doctrine into the prohibi-
tion against discriminatory state taxation is difficult, however, be-
cause the disparate tax treatment flowing from multiple burdens
results from several states' taxing statutes rather than those of a
single state. Hence, with multiple taxation a court could not justify
invalidating a challenged taxing statute on discrimination grounds
because it is impossible to attribute sole culpability for discrimina-
tion to that state's statute.195 As Professor Jerome Hellerstein has
pointed out, the architects of the multiple burdens test, Justices
Rutledge and Stone, "may possibly have been reluctant to catego-
rize as discriminatory a State tax which, considered without refer-
ence to the taxing powers of other States, appeared to treat intra-
state and interstate taxpayers equally."19 The Supreme Court
later echoed this reluctance in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v.
191. J. HELLERSTEIN. supra note 10, 4.8, at 125-26 (footnote omitted); see also, J.
Hellerstein, State Tax Discrimination Against Out-of-Staters, 30 NAT'L TAX J. 113, 120-21
(1977).
192. See J. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 10, 4.8, at 122-23. According to Professor Hel-
lerstein, "If the multiple taxation doctrine is being interred . . . the question arises as to
what, if anything, remains of the long-standing principle that State taxes may be struck
down as repugnant to the unexercised power of Congress to regulate the commerce?" Id. at
123.
193. 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
194. Id. at 458 (citations omitted); see also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes,
445 U.S. 425, 443-44 (1980) (Court addressed the multiple burdens question as an element
of discrimination); Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1938) (holding
that gross receipts tax imposed by origin state violated the antidiscrimination requirement
of the commerce clause because it imposed the risk of multiple taxation).
195. See P. HARTMAN, 1985 SuPPLEMENT, supra note 9, § 2:19.
196. J. Hellerstein, supra note 191, at 121.
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Bair,197 in which the Court refused to hold that Iowa's single-factor
apportionment formula discriminated against interstate commerce.
Although the Court conceded that the interaction of the appor-
tionment formulas of Iowa and Illinois might result in duplicative
taxation, it contended that "whatever disparity [that] may have
existed is not attributable to the Iowa statute.. . . [T]he alleged
disparity can only be the consequence of the combined effect of
the Iowa and Illinois statutes, and Iowa is not responsible for the
latter,"119 8 Moreover, in Container Corp. of America v. Franchise
Tax Board9" the Court remarked that the antidiscrimination prin-
ciple had not been construed "to require that a state apportion-
ment formula not differ so substantially from methods of alloca-
tion used by other jurisdictions in which the taxpayer is subject to
taxation so as to produce double taxation of the same income and
a resultant tax burden higher than the taxpayer would incur if its
business were limited to any one jurisdiction. 2 0 0 In short, the mul-
tiple burdens doctrine does not fit easily into the antidiscrimina-
tion requirement because the multiple burdens doctrine refers to
the taxation of a single taxpayer by more than one state, and dis-
crimination implies disparate taxation of different taxpayers by a
single state.20'
In examining the taxation of foreign commerce, the Supreme
Court explicitly has incorporated the multiple burdens test. The
Court has held that a tax on foreign commerce must meet two re-
quirements in addition to the four prongs of Complete Auto
Transit.20 2 One of these additional requirements is that the tax
must not create a substantial risk of international tax multiplica-
tion.20 3 Separate incorporation of the multiple burdens doctrine in
foreign commerce jurisprudence suggests that the Court may not
view this doctrine as implicit in the prohibition against
discrimination.
Evolving jurisprudence reveals that the Court increasingly is
reluctant to hold a state tax unconstitutionally discriminatory on
197. 437 U.S. 267 (1978).
198. Id. at 277 n.12.
199. 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
200. Id. at 170-71.
201. See Case Note, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: An Analysis of Current
Standards Promulgated by the United States Supreme Court-Department of Revenue v.
Association of Washington Stevedoring Companies, 28 DE PAUL L. REV. 205, 223 (1978).
202. For a discussion of the foreign commerce clause, see supra notes 61-67 and ac-
companying text.
203. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 446-48 (1979).
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the ground that it threatens interstate commerce with multiple
burdens of taxation.204 In the past, this reluctance has been re-
flected in an insistence that the taxpayer prove actual multiple
burdens to invalidate the state tax.20 5 Relying on its opinion in
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes,08 the Court in Exxon
Corp. v. Department of Revenue20 1 stated: "[I]t is the risk of mul-
tiple taxation that is being asserted; actual multiple taxation has
not been shown. While of course 'the constitutionality of a [Wis-
consin] tax should not depend on the vagaries of [another State's]
tax policy,' nonetheless 'the absence of any existing duplicative tax
does alter the nature of appellant's claim.' -1208 Similarly, in Gen-
eral Motors Corp. v. Washington20 9 the Court emphasized that the
taxpayer "has not demonstrated what definite burden, in a consti-
tutional sense, the St. Louis tax places on the identical interstate
shipments by which Washington measures its tax.
'210
More recently the Court has steered away from framing state
tax discrimination issues in the guise of the multiple burdens doc-
trine. Cases such as Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty make no mention of
multiple burdens.211 Arguably, then, the Court is heading toward
the conclusion that the multiple burdens doctrine should not be
subsumed under the prohibition against discrimination.
Although multiple burdens of taxation may not be attributa-
ble to a single state's taxing scheme, it still may be possible to
challenge a state tax as discriminatory by hypothesizing situations
in which one state's taxing scheme clearly causes disparate tax
204. See L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 6-17, at 360-61. Professor Tribe notes that the Court
has made the rule against cumulative burdens "so difficult to invoke with success." Id. He
suggests that there should be a "re-evaluation of rigid rules bearing on cumulative burdens."
Id.
205. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980) (holding
that Vermont could include dividends from foreign subsidiaries and affiliates in the appor-
tionment base of its income tax even though New York, the state of commercial domicile,
had the power to tax dividend income without apportionment); Exxon Corp. v. Department
of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980) (holding that income derived from oil production outside
the state was apportionable by Wisconsin despite taxpayer's separate functional accounting
system and the fact that the state of production had the right to tax such income); General
Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964) (holding that Washington tax on the privi-
lege of doing business in the state measured by gross receipts was constitutional even
though other jurisdictions could impose taxes measured by the same gross receipts).
206. 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
207. 447 U.S. 207 (1980).
208. Id. at 228-29 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp., 445 U.S. at 444).
209. 377 U.S. 436 (1964).
210. Id. at 449.
211. See Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638 (1984); see also Maryland v. Louisiana,
451 U.S. 725 (1981).
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treatment. In Armco the Court found that a West Virginia gross
receipts tax that exempted local manufacturers was unconstitu-
tionally discriminatory after determining that it was not internally
consistent.2 12 As Professor Hartman has pointed out, the taxpayer
circumvented the causation problem by avoiding the multiple taxa-
tion accusation and by claiming instead that the West Virginia tax
was intrinsically flawed.2 13 The taxpayer demonstrated the intrin-
sic flaw by hypothesizing that if all states employed the West Vir-
ginia taxation method, then an interstate seller would be subjected
to greater taxation than a purely intrastate seller. 14
B. Formulary Apportionment and State Tax Discrimination
In contrast to the situation in Armco, it may be difficult to
challenge a state's income tax apportionment formula as lacking in
internal consistency. In Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair215 the
Court upheld Iowa's single-factor gross receipts formula for appor-
tioning net income. The Court reasoned that the taxpayer's objec-
tion to the formula was based not on any intrinsic flaw in the
formula itself, but rather on its variance from the standard three-
factor formula used in most states. The commerce clause does not
require, the Court held, a nationally uniform apportionment
formula.
216
Despite a finding of internal consistency, however, it may be
possible to demonstrate that a single state's apportionment
method risks disparate tax treatment between certain taxpayers.
For instance, it may be possible to hypothesize a situation in which
formulary apportionment subjects an interstate taxpayer to more
tax liability than a purely intrastate taxpayer conducting exactly
the same activities within the state. For example, assume that two
taxpayers both manufacture and sell widgets. Further suppose that
both of these taxpayers have the exact same property, payroll, and
sales within the taxing state. Assume also that one of these taxpay-
ers also conducts business outside the taxing state that does not
contribute to or depend on the in-state operations in any material
way and that the other taxpayer has no operations outside the
212. 467 U.S. at 644-46.
213. P. HARTMAN, 1985 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 9, § 2:19, at 31.
214. See Armco, 467 U.S. at 644. The dissent argued that the internal consistency test
should be restricted to net income taxes and not applied to transactional taxes. Id. at 648
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
215. 437 U.S. 267 (1978).
216. Id. at 276-81.
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state. The tax base of the purely intrastate taxpayer will be the
taxpayer's total income. The tax base of the interstate taxpayer, on
the other hand, will be determined by applying the state's appor-
tionment formula to the taxpayer's total income. Even assuming
that the taxing state uses the standard three-factor apportionment
formula based on property, payroll, and sales, there is no guaran-
tee that this formula will result in a tax base identical to that of
the purely intrastate taxpayer. It is possible that the interstate
taxpayer's tax base may be larger than that of the intrastate tax-
payer.217 Opponents of separate accounting would argue that it is
impossible to prove that the interstate taxpayer's operations in the
taxing state are exactly the same as the intrastate taxpayer's oper-
ations. It is, however, possible to hypothesize such a situation.
The interstate taxpayer in the above example may wish to
challenge the apportionment formula on commerce clause grounds
under the fair apportionment and nondiscrimination prongs of
Complete Auto Transit. There is considerable (but not complete)
overlap between these two prongs of the Complete Auto Transit
test. Traditionally, in cases involving operational (e.g., net income)
taxes, as opposed to transactional (e.g., sales and use) taxes, com-
merce clause validity turns on the state's apportionment method,
and the second and third prongs of Complete Auto Transit are
then collapsed together.21 In Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax
Board the Court remarked, "[T]he anti-discrimination principle
has not in practice required much in addition to the requirement
of fair apportionment. 21' 9 Assuming that the state's apportionment
method would be deemed fair, the interstate taxpayer in our exam-
ple may have difficulty in proving a violation of the commerce
clause.22o
Apportionment methods that are deemed to be within the
realm of fairness, however, still could be found to cause unequal
tax treatment between certain individual taxpayers. As the Court
217. Of course, it also is possible that the interstate taxpayer's tax base may be
smaller than that of the intrastate taxpayer.
218. See Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 171 (1983); see also
Michael, The Constitutionality of Minnesota's Business Tax Credits After Westinghouse
Electric Corp., 4 J. STATE TAx'N 163, 166 (1985). According to Michael, "In almost all net
income tax cases the Court has treated the apportionment and discrimination tests as
equivalent. If the tax is fairly apportioned, it is also nondiscriminatory." Id.
219. 463 U.S. at 171.
220. But see Westinghouse Electric Corp., 466 U.S. at 398-99. Westinghouse suggests
that it may not be sufficient analysis of the nondiscriminatory requirement to find that a tax
is fairly apportioned. According to the Court, "'Fairly apportioned' and 'nondiscriminatory'
are not synonymous terms." Id. at 399.
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has pointed out, even the standard three-factor apportionment
formula used by many states and advocated in the Uniform Divi-
sion of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA)221 is imperfect in
attributing income to a state.222 Moreover, the Court has sustained
a single-factor apportionment formula over objections to its fair-
ness. Such a formula generally is viewed as even less successful in
attributing income to the state in which it was earned than the
three-factor approach.223
The results of challenging a state's apportionment formula on
fairness grounds should be contrasted with the results of challeng-
ing the apportionment formula on discrimination grounds.224 As-
sume a taxpayer argues that an apportionment formula causes dis-
parate tax treatment between an intrastate taxpayer not subject to
formulary apportionment and itself, an interstate taxpayer subject
to formulary apportionment who conducts the exact same activi-
ties within the taxing state as the intrastate taxpayer. This theory
raises a potential conflict between the commerce clause principles
that an apportionment formula need only be fair and that no state
tax may be discriminatory. This conflict arises because formulary
apportionment, although it is deemed fair, can be viewed in certain
cases as causing disparate tax treatment between specific intra-
state and interstate taxpayers.
The conflict between the commerce clause requirements of no
discrimination and fair apportionment can be analyzed on several
different levels. Arguably, a taxpayer cannot show disparate tax
treatment because it generally is impossible, via separate account-
ing, geographically to isolate the interstate taxpayer's in-state ac-
tivities. This approach, however, overlooks the fact that the dis-
crimination theory does not rely on the actual accuracy of separate
geographical accounting, but rather depends on a hypothetical dis-
parity between the tax bases attributable to interstate and intra-
state taxpayers in the state's taxing system. It clearly is possible to
hypothesize situations that all would agree constitute unequal tax
221. The UDITPA is a model act adopted by the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws at its annual conference meeting in 1957. For a detailed discus-
sion of UDITPA, see Tatarowicz, Problems in Allocating and Apportioning Income-an
Overview and Critique of Recent State Court Decisions, 3 N.Y.U. INST. ON STATE AND LocAL
TAX'N AND CONF. ON PROPERTY TAX'N § 3.00 (1985).
222. See Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 183 & n.20.
223. See Moorman Mfg. Co., 437 U.S. at 267.
224. See J. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 191. According to Professor Jerome Hellerstein,
"There may ... be a basis for invalidating some apportionment methods currently in use
on the ground that they discriminate against interstate commerce." Id. at 120.
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treatment between certain taxpayers. This hypothetical disparity
should be sufficient and there should be no need actually to prove
the disparity.
One also might argue that the analysis of a state's apportion-
ment formula should end with a conclusion that it is fair according
to the standards set forth in the second prong of the Complete
Auto Transit test. This conclusion, however, ignores the recog-
nized overlap between the second and third prongs of Complete
Auto Transit. Alternatively, one might concede that formulary ap-
portionment does result in discrimination, but that discrimination
is not always per se invalid under the commerce clause. But, this
approach is a dangerous resolution of the conflict because it opens
up the door for the Court to permit other types of state tax dis-
crimination. Perhaps the best resolution of the conflict is to con-
clude that a state's formulary apportionment scheme may cause
disparate tax treatment, but that the discrimination weighs only
against certain individuals engaged in commerce and not against a
protected class of commerce. 5 The antidiscrimination provision,
then, is viewed as promoting equal treatment of interstate and for-
eign commerce and not identical treatment of all taxpayers en-
gaged in such commerce.
V. NEGATIVE EFFECTS ON PROTECTED COMMERCE
After a court determines that a state tax statute causes dispa-
rate tax treatment, it next must determine whether the inequality
weighs against protected commerce. This determination requires a
two-part analysis: first, the protected commerce that the tax stat-
ute affects must be identified;228 and second, it must be determined
whether the effect of the tax statute on protected commerce is ben-
eficial, burdensome, or neutral.
The commerce clause protects interstate and foreign com-
merce, not intrastate commerce. Moreover, the commerce clause
protects only commerce and not individual taxpayers engaged in
commerce.2 27 Only state tax statutes imposing burdens on pro-
tected commerce generally are unconstitutional under the com-
225. See infra notes 233-37 and accompanying text.
226. To invoke commerce clause scrutiny in the first place, the taxpayer must show
that the challenged statute has an effect on protected commerce. Hence, if there is no effect
on protected commerce, no commerce clause analysis is warranted.
227. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 105 S. Ct. 1676, 1683 (1985) (in holding
that an Alabama gross premiums tax may violate the equal protection clause, the Court
pointed out that the commerce clause protects interstate commerce, whereas the equal pro-
tection clause protects persons.).
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merce clause. Accordingly, it may be constitutional for a tax stat-
ute to benefit intrastate commerce if the resulting effect on
interstate commerce is neutral rather than negative. As discussed
below,2 28 however, it is unclear whether a statute is unconstitu-
tional if it benefits certain protected commerce, but burdens other
protected commerce.
A. Identifying Protected Commerce
1. Interstate and Foreign Commerce Protected
The commerce clause protects interstate and foreign com-
merce, not local commerce, against discrimination. Both the com-
merce clause language and its underlying policies identify inter-
state and foreign commerce as protected commerce. The commerce
clause gives Congress the power to regulate commerce "with for-
eign Nations and among the several States.' ' 229 The commerce
clause is designed to promote free trade among the states, assure
national uniformity in foreign commerce, and circumvent parochial
biases of state legislators.23
The commerce clause is not designed to protect local com-
merce. Theoretically, local interests are represented in the state's
political processes and do not need the protection afforded by the
commerce clause. Moreover, the commerce clause is designed to 'fa-
cilitate free trade across sovereign jurisdictions and is not con-
cerned with free trade within a single jurisdiction. As the Court
has pointed out, "[T]he fundamental purpose of the Clause is to
assure that there be free trade among the several states. This free
trade purpose is not confined to the freedom to trade with only one
State; it is a freedom to trade with any State, to engage in com-
merce across all state boundaries."231 Hence, a state taxing scheme
is not invalid under the commerce clause because local taxpayers
are taxed at a higher rate than out-of-state taxpayers.32
228. See infra notes 279-90 and accompanying text.
229. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
230. See Barrett supra note 10, § 1.02(2); Case Note, supra note 3, at 840-41.
231. Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 335.
232. Cf. Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U.S. 199 (1961). (although the Court did not di-
rectly address the issue of preferring interstate commerce over local commerce, it held that
an Alaska tax on freezer fishing ships taking salmon from Alaskan territorial waters for
interstate commerce was valid under the commerce clause even though a higher tax was
imposed on similar freezer ships engaged in intrastate commerce).
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2. Commerce and Not Taxpayers Protected
The commerce clause protects commerce and not the individ-
ual taxpayers engaging in commerce. Again, the commerce clause
language and its purposes reveal a focus on interstate and foreign
trade rather than on out-of-state taxpayers. It is this focus on com-
merce instead of taxpayers that makes it possible for courts to find
a tax on commerce originating from inside the taxing state in viola-
tion of the commerce clause.233
In addition, this focus on commerce as opposed to taxpayers
may best reconcile the conflict discussed earlier '34 that exists be-
tween the commerce clause principles that a state tax need only be
fairly apportioned, but cannot discriminate to any extent against
interstate commerce.2 ' 5 Even though one may be able to show that
formulary apportionment disadvantages an interstate taxpayer as
compared to a purely domestic taxpayer conducting the same ac-
tivities within the taxing state, this showing does not prove dis-
crimination against interstate commerce. Although formulary ap-
portionment may disadvantage certain interstate taxpayers as
compared to their wholly intrastate competitors, it also may result
in less tax for other interstate taxpayers as compared to in-state
taxpayers conducting the same activities within the taxing state. In
other words, formulary apportionment does not discriminate
against interstate commerce because it does not consistently bur-
den interstate commerce; it only may disadvantage particular in-
terstate taxpayers.
Although the commerce clause does not address individual
taxpayers, other constitutional provisions provide protection to in-
dividuals against state tax discrimination. Under the equal protec-
tion clause, no state may discriminate against a class of taxpayers
unless the classification is rationally related to a legitimate state
purpose.38 Moreover, a tax statute cannot so narrowly single out a
group of taxpayers for adverse treatment that it constitutes a bill
of attainder.3 7
233. See Commonwealth Edison, 453 U.S. at 616 ("State taxes levied on a 'local' activ-
ity preceding entry of the goods into interstate commerce may substantially affect interstate
commerce, and this effect is the proper focus of Commerce Clause inquiry.").
234. See supra notes 215-25 and accompanying text.
235. Thus, the fair apportionment requirement appears to be a standard that allows
for reasonable compliance, whereas the antidiscrimination requirement is an absolute
prohibition.
236. See infra notes 320-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of state tax dis-
crimination under the equal protection clause.
237. See Barrett, supra note 10, § 1.0515].
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B. Classifying Effects as Burdensome
Generally, disparate tax treatment that burdens protected
commerce is unconstitutional under the commerce clause. Clearly,
a taxing scheme imposing greater tax liabilities on interstate busi-
ness than on intrastate business burdens interstate commerce.23 8
As the Supreme Court stated in Armco, "[A] State may not tax a
transaction or incident more heavily when it crosses state lines
than when it occurs entirely within the State. '239 Moreover, it is
unconstitutionally burdensome for a state to impose a greater tax
on nonresidents doing business in other states than on nonresi-
dents doing business in the taxing state.240 According to the Court
in Boston Stock Exchange,
A State may no more use discriminatory taxes to assure that nonresidents
direct their commerce to businesses within the State than to assure that resi-
dents trade only in intrastate commerce. As we stated at the outset, the fun-
damental purpose of the Clause is to assure that there be free trade among
the several States. This free trade purpose is not confined to the freedom to
trade with only one State; it is a freedom to trade with any State, to engage
in commerce across all state boundaries.2 4
1. Legitimate State Tax Incentives vs. Unconstitutional State
Tax Discrimination
A tax incentive rewarding in-state activities without similarly
rewarding the same out-of-state activities clearly ties a taxpayer's
effective tax rate to the choice of whether to conduct an activity
within the state. Although such an incentive introduces a distinc-
tion in the state tax code between in-state and out-of-state activi-
ties, this distinction probably should not be considered unconstitu-
tional discrimination against protected commerce.
The concern over the constitutionality of such tax incentives
has its roots in several Supreme Court decisions242 that may be
read as drawing into question any state tax incentive offered exclu-
sively with respect to in-state activities. On closer examination,
however, it appears that a state tax incentive that focuses exclu-
sively on a taxpayer's in-state activities does not have the sort of
negative impact on interstate commerce with which the commerce
238. See, e.g., Armco, 467 U.S. at 642; see also Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co.,
373 U.S. at 72.
239. 467 U.S. at 642.
240. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
241. Id. at 334-35.
242. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 466 U.S. at 388; Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at
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clause is concerned. Rather, the key to finding a tax incentive un-
constitutionally discriminatory appears to be a reliance by the
state tax provision on both a taxpayer's in-state and out-of-state
activities in determining the taxpayer's effective tax rate. Such a
provision clearly has a negative impact on interstate commerce. A
provision that relies exclusively on a taxpayer's in-state activities
in determining an effective tax rate, however, arguably does not
have a negative effect on interstate commerce. First and foremost,
then, it is necessary to examine the principle that a tax incentive
will not be found in violation of the commerce clause unless it has
a negative impact on protected commerce. In addition, it is possi-
ble that a tax incentive challenged as discriminatory can be sus-
tained on another ground. For instance, it may be difficult for a
taxpayer challenging a particular tax incentive to establish that the
tax incentive in question is, in fact, the source of the
discrimination.
One case that may be helpful in identifying which tax incen-
tives discriminate against protected commerce is Boston Stock Ex-
change v. State Tax Commission.24- In that case appellant-stock
exchanges challenged two amendments to New York's transfer tax
on securities,4 which provided for a fifty percent reduction in the
tax rate for transactions by nonresidents involving New York sales
and a maximum tax liability of any taxpayer (resident or nonresi-
dent) of 350 dollars for a single transaction if it involved a New
York sale. The exchanges alleged, consistently with statements in
the legislative history of the challenged amendments,245 that these
243. 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
244. Act of June 16, 1968, ch. 827, 1968 N.Y. Laws 2530 (codified at N.Y. TAX LAW
§ 270.1 (McKinney 1966)).
245. The legislature's intent to divert sales to New York exchanges appeared clearly
within the amendment's legislative history:
The securities industry, and particularly the stock exchanges located within the state
have contributed importantly to the economy of the state and its recognition as the
financial center of the world. The growth of exchanges in other regions of the country
and the diversion of business to those exchanges of individuals who are nonresidents of
the state of New York, requires recognition that the tax on transfers of stock imposed
by article twelve of the tax law, is an important contributing element to the diversion
of sales to other areas to the detriment of the economy of the state. Furthermore, in
the case of transactions involving large blocks of stock, recognition must be given to the
ease of completion of such sales outside the state of New York without the payment of
any tax. In order to encourage the effecting by nonresidents of the state of New York
of their sales within the state of New York and the retention within the state of New
York of sales involving large blocks of stock, a separate classification of the tax on sales
by nonresidents of the state of New York and a maximum tax for certain large block
sales are desirable.
Id. at 2530-31, quoted in Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 326-27. Furthermore, Governor
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provisions diverted transactions from out-of-state exchanges to
New York exchanges. The Court unanimously held that these pro-
visions discriminated against interstate commerce in violation of
the commerce clause.246
In striking down these amendments, the Court emphasized
that the commerce clause prohibits states from enacting "laws that
favor local enterprises at the expense of out-of-state businesses.
24 7
Thus the Court indicated that there must be a negative impact on
interstate commerce before an unconstitutional burden on inter-
state commerce will be found. Under this approach, the New York
amendments were unconstitutional because they "create[d] both
an advantage for the exchanges in New York and a discriminatory
burden on commerce to its sister States. '248 The amendments tied
the effective rate of tax not only to the New York activity with
which the state identified the taxable moment, but also to whether
another activity (i.e., sale on an exchange) took place in New York
or in another state. A lower effective rate resulted if the sale on an
exchange occurred in New York.
In addition, the Court in Boston Stock Exchange carefully
emphasized that tax incentives without negative effects on inter-
state commerce could withstand commerce clause scrutiny:
Our decision today does not prevent the States from structuring their tax
systems to encourage the growth and development of intrastate commerce
and industry. Nor do we hold that a State may not compete with other States
for a share of interstate commerce; such competition lies at the heart of a free
trade policy. We hold only that in the process of competition no State may
discriminatorily tax the products manufactured or the business operations
performed in any other State.
249
Before New York amended its transfer tax, the choice of an ex-
change "was not influenced by the transfer tax. ' 250 In contrast, be-
cause of the amendments, "the choice of exchange by all nonresi-
dents and by residents engaging in large transactions [was] not
Nelson Rockefeller's memorandum of approval of the transfer tax amendment explained:
"The bill recognizes the changing character of the securities industry and the importance of
its continued presence and strength for the future economic prosperity of the State and will
provide long-term relief from some of the competitive pressures from outside the State."
PUBLIC PAPERS OF GOVERNOR NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER 553 (1968), quoted in Boston Stock
Exch., 429 U.S. at 327 n.10; PUBLIC PAPERS OF GOVERNOR NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER 552-54
(1968); 1968 McKinneys Session Laws of New York, Vol. 2, p. 2384.
246. 429 U.S. at 318.
247. Id. at 329.
248. Id. at 331.
249. Id. at 336-37.
250. Id. at 330.
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made solely on the basis of nontax criteria. "251
The Court contrasted the amendments' effect on interstate
commerce in Boston Stock Exchange with decisions sustaining
compensating use taxes, such as Henneford v. Silas Mason Co.
252
and General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission.253 In those de-
cisions the Court held that compensating use taxes merely bal-
anced the sales tax burden on in-state sales. By enacting compen-
sating use taxes, a state again rendered the decision whether to
purchase goods in interstate commerce neutral so that "an individ-
ual faced with the choice of an in-state or out-of-state purchase
could make that choice without regard to the tax consequences. "251
Thus, a true compensating use tax does not tie the effective tax on
a purchase to the choice of a market. In contrast, the New York
provisions made taxes an important consideration in the choice of
a stock exchange.
Although promotion of tax neutrality may be a useful starting
point in evaluating a state's tax incentives, the Court's emphasis
on the foreclosure of tax neutral decisions in Boston Stock Ex-
change creates complex problems. Many state statutes granting
tax incentives-including job credits,255 investment credits,256 and
251. Id. at 331.
252. 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
253. 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
254. See Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 332.
255. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 43.20.021(d), 43.20.042 (Supp. 1985); CAL. REV. & TAX
CODE §§ 17053.7, 24330 (West Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 2011 (1985); IDAHO
CODE § 63-3029F (Supp. 1985); Ky. REV. STAT. § 141.065 (Supp. 1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 47:34 (West Supp. 1986); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 63, § 31C (West Supp. 1986); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 15-31-124 to -126 (1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-38-30.1 (1983); -- PA. TAX
REFORM CODE § 1701-A.
Additionally, some states not only restrict their jobs-type credits to in-state invest-
ments, but further limit them to specified locations, such as enterprise zones. See, e.g., CAL.
REV. & TAX CODE § 17053.8 (West Supp. 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-217e (West 1983
& Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 2011 (1985); Illinois Income Tax Act § 201(h), ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 2-201(h) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); IND. CODE § 6-3-3-10 (1984); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 79-32, 153 (1984); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:1787 (West Supp. 1986); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 81, § 291-A (Supp. 1985); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 63, § 38E (West Supp. 1986);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 273.1314 (West Supp. 1986); MISS. CODE ANN. § 27-7-22 (Supp. 1985);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 135.225 (Vernon Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27H-78 (West 1986);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5709.65 (Page Supp. 1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 690.4 (West
Supp. 1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-7-616 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985).
Some states condition their credits on a certain level of investment in property in addi-
tion to a job-creation requirement, or grant a credit based on both new investments and new
jobs. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-22-508.3 (19XX); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 2-201(g)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 5215 (Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 135.110.1 (Vernon Supp. 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-9A-3 to -9 (1983); N.Y. TAX LAW §
210.11 (McKinney Supp. 1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 2357.4, .5 (West Supp. 1985); W.
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research credits257 -explicitly are limited to in-state activities. Fur-
thermore, it may be presumed that many of these statutes were
enacted in attempts to foreclose tax neutral decisions and that the
limitations of the incentives to in-state activities would not be sev-
erable from the remainder of the statutes.25 s If these incentives are
constitutional, the Court must distinguish permissible and imper-
missible attempts to foreclose tax neutrality. Perhaps the Court's
tax neutrality requirement may be limited best by recognizing that
the constitutional infirmity in Boston Stock Exchange was that
the decision of which stock exchange to use, which previously had
been made without state tax consequences, systematically was bi-
ased by the challenged amendments against other states' ex-
changes and in favor of New York exchanges.
Likewise, in Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily259 a
negative effect on interstate commerce was created because Louisi-
ana's use tax base included labor and overhead, but these items
were excluded from the sales tax base. Accordingly, a provision re-
lating to the determination of Louisiana's use tax base was struck
down because its effect would have been to encourage taxpayers to
move existing assembly operations into the state and/or to en-
courage them to fractionalize assembly operations. The Court
again carefully distinguished discrimination in the tax base from
constitutional compensatory use taxes. In contrast to the dispari-
ties between the Louisiana sales and use tax bases before the
Court, a compensating use tax imposed on the same base as the
sales tax presumably would have had little or no impact on the
VA. CODE §§ 11-13C1 to -13 (Supp. 1985).
256. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 43.20.036(b) (1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-22-507.5
(1979); IDAHO CODE § 63-3029B (Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-32.153 (Supp. 1981); N.Y.
TAX LAW § 210.11 (McKinney Supp. 1986); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 5733.061 (Page Supp.
1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-31-1 (1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-4-808(3) (Supp. 1985).
As noted supra note 255, some states condition their credits on a combination of new
jobs as well as increased investment in the state. Other states limit their credits to invest-
ments in enterprise zones. See, e.g., Act of Nov. 29, 1967, No. 292, 1967 Pa. Laws 636.
257. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 6-3.1-4-1 to -6 (Burns Supp. 1985); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 422.33 (West Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.068(1), (6) (West Supp. 1986); N.Y. TAX
LAW § 606(h) (McKinney Supp. 1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 71.09(12r) (West Supp. 1985).
258. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 34A (West Supp. 1986) ("The intent of this Sec-
tion is solely to reward the generation of new full-time and part-time jobs in the state of
Louisiana."). MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-31-126 (1985) ("This credit is available only to those
new and expanding corporations that provide jobs within the state of Montana."); c.f. Act of
June 16, 1968, ch. 827, 1968 N.Y. Laws 2530, 2530-31 (codified at N.Y. TAX LAW § 270.1
(McKinney 1966), quoted in Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 326-27 (legislative history of
provisions struck down in Boston Stock Exch.,). For the relevant text of the legislative his-
tory, see note 245.
259. 373 U.S. 64 (1963).
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number or location of Halliburton's plants. 60
The discrimination against protected commerce in Boston
Stock Exchange and in Halliburton existed because a taxpayer's
effective tax rates were dependent, not only on the activities the
taxpayer performed in the state, but also on the activities per-
formed in other states.26 1 Thus, the tax provisions and the effective
tax rates were not tied exclusively to in-state activities. There is no
indication, however, that these cases require a state to offer incen-
tives regardless of the state in which the desired activities occur;
the cases indicate only that the effective tax rates must not be tied
to out-of-state activities. Furthermore, the suggestion that a tax
incentive may be offered only for activities within the state is not
confined to transaction taxes. Rather, this analysis is further borne
out by a recent case dealing with an income tax incentive, West-
inghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully.
262
In Westinghouse the Court struck down New York's DISC
credit, which had been apportioned using two factors: (1) the tax-
payer's New York allocation percentage, and (2) the ratio of gross
receipts from New York shipments to total export-related gross re-
ceipts ("the gross receipts factor").2 63 The commerce clause prob-
lem with the credit arose from the gross receipts factor.2 64 As the
Court observed, one effect of this factor was that as total DISC
gross receipts increased, the New York credit actually would de-
crease if the gross receipts related to New York shipments in-
creased at a slower rate than the overall increase in the taxpayer's
export shipments.265
260. Id. at 70 (citing Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937)).
261. Another way of analyzing the negative effects on interstate commerce, and thus
limiting the principle that state tax laws cannot impair neutral economic decision making, is
to focus on the effect that the tax law has on the distribution of a limited amount of activ-
ity. Both Boston Stock Exchange and Halliburton involved situations in which the state
attempted to redistribute a limited amount of activity from out-of-state into the taxing
state. Thus, it can be concluded that the number of security transactions occurring on the
Boston Stock Exchange and the number of oil well servicing vehicles customized by Halli-
burton were determined by factors other than state tax considerations. Consequently, state
tax provisions can serve only to redistribute the fixed amount of these activities.
In contrast, the typical investment credit, jobs credit, or research credit may not have
been enacted with the primary intent of diverting activity from other states. Instead, many
tax incentives appear to have been enacted to encourage a higher level of the desired activ-
ity (investment or jobs or research) within the state through the creation of more of the
activity. There may be no (or little) diversion of the activity from other states and hence no
negative effects on interstate commerce.
262. 466 U.S. 388 (1984).
263. N.Y. TAx LAW § 210.13(a)(2)-(5) (McKinney Supp. 1986).
264. See id. § 210.13(a).
265. 466 U.S. at 402 n.9 (Table C).
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The New York DISC credit not only encouraged activities in
New York, but its gross receipts factor actually penalized activities
outside the state. 66 According to the Court,
This adjustment has the effect of allowing a parent a greater tax credit on its
accumulated DISC income as its subsidiary's DISC moves a greater percent-
age of its shipping activities into the State of New York. Conversely, the ad-
justment decreases the tax credit allowed to the parent for a given amount of
its DISC's shipping activity conducted from New York as the DISC increases
its shipping activities in other States. Thus, not only does the New York tax
scheme 'provide a positive incentive for increased business activity in New
York State,' but also it penalizes increases in the DISC's shipping activities in
other States.2
67
Westinghouse, then, suggests that valid tax incentives may be
distinguished from unconstitutional discrimination by determining
whether interstate commerce is negatively affected. A tax incentive
that does not penalize out-of-state activity presumably could with-
stand scrutiny under the commerce clause after Westinghouse.
The Court indicated that a constitutional DISC credit could be
drafted: "[I]t is not the provision of the credit that offends the
Commerce Clause, but the fact that it is allowed on an impermissi-
ble basis, i.e., the percentage of a specific segment of the corpora-
tion's business that is conducted in New York."2 6s The Court fur-
ther suggested that if the gross receipts factor were severed, the
statute would be constitutional; the New York Court of Appeals
adopted this remedy on remand.269 There is, however, a problem
with defining the breadth of the Westinghouse holding. Although
severing the gross receipts factor saved the New York credit from
being completely invalidated, this remedy raises an interesting is-
sue regarding the constitutionality of tax incentives in general. The
New York court's remedy left a DISC credit effectively granted
without reference to New York activities. The United States Su-
preme Court did not indicate that New York's use of its more gen-
266. Id. at 400-01.
267. Id. (quoting New York State Division of the Budget, Report on A.12108-A and
S.10544 (May 23, 1972), reprinted in Bill Jacket of 1972 N.Y. Law, Ch. 778, at p. 18).
268. Id. at 406 n.12. See also Comptroller of the Treasury v. Armco, Inc., No.
85326007/C1-42988 (Md. Cir. Ct., April 29, 1986) (holding that Maryland's exemption of
DISC dividends, when at least 50 percent of the net income of the DISC is subject to Mary-
land taxation, unconstitutionally discriminates against interstate commerce).
269. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 63 N.Y.2d 191, 470 N.E.2d 853, 481
N.Y.S.2d 55 (1984). See also Comptroller of the Treasury v. Armco, Inc., No. 85326007/Cl-
42988 (Md. Cir. Ct., April 29, 1986) (holding that principles of severability require that the
unconstitutional flaw in the DISC exemption be eliminated so that dividends received from
any DISC are exempt from Maryland tax, regardless of the amount of income of that DISC
which is subject to Maryland taxation).
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eral income allocation percentage created any constitutional
problems, even though a taxpayer's New York DISC activities
might incidentally affect this percentage. Other than this inciden-
tal effect, however, a taxpayer could obtain the same New York
credit regardless of whether its DISC activities were related to
New York.
If Westinghouse mandates the sort of neutrality whereby a tax
incentive is permissible only if offered without reference to the tax-
payer's in-state activities, many current state tax credits violate
the commerce clause. 270 In rejecting New York's argument that its
credit fostered export activities consistent with federal policies be-
hind the DISC provisions and the commerce clause, the Court used
language that suggested a very broad scope might be given to the
concept of tax neutrality:
Whether the discriminatory tax diverts new business into the State or merely
prevents current business from being diverted elsewhere, it is still a discrimi-
natory tax that "forecloses tax-neutral decisions and ... creates ... an ad-
vantage" for firms operating in New York by placing "a discriminatory bur-
den on commerce to its sister States."
2 7'
Carried to its extreme, this line of analysis would invalidate any
state tax incentive granted only with reference to in-state activi-
ties. In our survey of state tax incentives, most incentives clearly
and explicitly were limited to in-state activities.2 72 Moreover, in
contrast to the finding of the New York Court of Appeals on re-
mand in Westinghouse,273 it would seem unlikely that many of the
limitations on tax incentives to in-state activities would be found
to be severable. 74
Some commentators have suggested that the Court's reading
of the commerce clause in Westinghouse signals a substantial limi-
tation on the states' powers to offer tax incentives. For example,
Professors Seago and Schell have suggested that after Westing-
house the Court may find that a state tax credit discriminates
against interstate commerce "[i]f the induced or rewarded behav-
ior relates to the conduct of business in the state. ' 275 Similarly,
another commentator has concluded that the language of the
270. See supra notes 255-58.
271. 466 U.S. at 406 (quoting Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 331).
272. See supra notes 255-58.
273. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 63 N.Y.2d 191, 470 N.E.2d 853, 481 N.Y.S.2d
55 (1984).
274. See supra note 258 for several examples of state tax statutes in which it would
appear to be impossible to sever the in-state limitation from the remainder of the credit.
275. Seago & Schell, Tax Credits and the Commerce Clause After Westinghouse Elec-
tric Corporation, 3 J. STATE TAX'N 101, 111 (1984).
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Westinghouse opinion implies that an incentive is unconstitutional
if it imposes higher taxes on out-of-state activities than on similar
in-state activities. In other words, if the incentive results in higher
effective tax rates on out-of-state investments or activities, the in-
centive is unconstitutional.2 7 6 This interpretation of Westinghouse
certainly is plausible in light of the Court's language and the rem-
edy adopted by the New York appellate court on remand, the sev-
erance of the credit from any direct reference to New York
activities.
Assuming, however, that the Court did not intend to invali-
date the vast majority of state tax incentives, the DISC credit in
Westinghouse must be distinguished from other tax incentives. A
logical way to distinguish Westinghouse may be to focus on the
negative effects of the New York DISC credit provision on inter-
state commerce. As explained earlier, the New York credit not only
rewarded in-state activity, but also penalized out-of-state activ-
ity.2 7 7 In contrast to New York's DISC credit, which the taxpayer's
out-of-state activities negatively affected, a tax incentive could be
designed without reference to out-of-state activities. For example,
if an out-of-state business investing one million dollars in a state is
entitled to the same investment credit that an in-state business
would receive if it likewise decided to invest one million dollars in
the state, and no reduction in the credit results from out-of-state
investment, then the credit does not have a negative discrimina-
tory impact on protected commerce.
The infirmity of the New York DISC credit was that once the
taxpayer's tax base was determined, thereby arriving at an amount
of income New York clearly had jurisdiction to tax, the state again
looked outside the state through the gross receipts factor in deter-
mining the tax paid by the corporation. This resulted in penalties
for out-of-state activities. In contrast, if the taxpayer's effective tax
rate is determined solely with reference to in-state activities, there
appear to be no negative effects on interstate commerce.
In addition to the absence of negative effects on interstate
276. Michael, supra note 218, at 172.
277. See supra note 266 and accompanying text. Michael has suggested a similar
analysis:
If the U.S. Supreme Court does not wish to invalidate literally hundreds of state in-
come tax credits, the distinction between a credit that rewards increases in in-state
activity with lower effective tax rates and a credit that penalizes relative increases in
out-of-state activity may provide a convenient basis for refusing to extend
Westinghouse.
Michael, supra note 218, (emphasis in original).
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commerce, there is another reason why it is difficult to find that a
tax incentive focusing exclusively on a taxpayer's in-state activities
discriminates against interstate commerce. Such an incentive pro-
vides the identical tax benefits for two taxpayers conducting the
same activities in the state when one taxpayer also conducts inter-
state business. The taxpayer facing a higher effective tax rate in
the state because it conducts the incentive-related activities
outside the state is the one with a possible claim that it is being
"discriminated" against because it is engaging in the creditable ac-
tivity in another state. This taxpayer, however, will face significant
obstacles in mounting a successful challenge to the incentive. First,
this multistate taxpayer, in essence, is arguing that it has to pay a
higher effective tax rate because the state's tax incentives do not
apply to activities conducted outside the state. A taxpayer claim-
ing that it faces a higher tax burden because it chooses to perform
its activities outside the state must show that the source of the
alleged multiple burdens is the state offering the incentive. This
showing may be difficult. If the incentive is internally consistent so
that no discrimination would exist if all the states offered the same
incentive, then it may be impossible to show that the disparity cre-
ated by the nonuniformity among the states' tax laws is caused by
the state offering the credit rather than the state not offering the
credit.2
78
2. Interstate Commerce vs. Foreign Commerce
Assessing the constitutionality of a statute that affects two
types of protected commerce in different manners may be difficult.
For instance, a tax statute could differentiate between interstate
commerce and foreign commerce. The courts addressed this issue
in the context of an old California ad valorem property tax statute
that was repealed in 1981. The California statute exempted from
property taxes two classes of goods: property produced outside the
United States and brought into California for transshipment out of
the state for sale, and goods brought into California from other
states for transshipment outside the United States 7 9 No exemp-
tion was allowed for goods produced in California to be shipped to
other states or for goods brought into California from other states
for shipment within the United States. Hence, the statute weighs
against certain interstate commerce in favor of foreign commerce
278. See supra notes 195-201 and accompanying text.
279. See CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 225 (West 1970) (repealed 1981). CAL. REV. & TAX
CODE § 219 now exempts all business inventory from taxation.
1986]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
and other interstate commerce.
The California statute has been challenged on commerce
clause grounds several times in the past decade. The courts, how-
ever, have had difficulty in resolving the issue whether a state tax
statute can prefer foreign commerce over interstate commerce.28
In holding the exemption unconstitutional, the California Court of
Appeals in 1978 reasoned that the commerce clause prohibits not
only discrimination in favor of local commerce and against inter-
state or foreign commerce, but also "discriminatory tax burdens
which favor one class of commerce, subject to the control of Con-
gress over another such class." '
Although one court of appeals had declared the exemption un-
constitutional, the exemption remained in the California law, and
only taxpayers in Los Angeles Conty were denied the benefit of
the exemption.2 82 In 1984 a taxpayer challenged the county's right
to deny the benefit of the exemption.28 " Although the trial court
held that the exemption was unconstitutional, the California Court
of Appeals reversed and held that the exemption did not violate
the commerce clause. In disposing of the discrimination issue, the
court focused on the effect of the provisions on out-of-state tax-
payers rather than on interstate commerce and avoided the issue
of preferring foreign commerce over interstate commerce.284 Thus,
the court appears to have equated equal treatment of California
and non-California taxpayers as equivalent to nondiscrimination
against interstate commerce. According to the court, "It is essen-
tial to note that the ineligibility [for the property tax exemption]
applies equally to California and non-California business enti-
ties. 2 8 5 Moreover, the court made no analysis of the comparative
effects of the statute on interstate and foreign commerce. The
280. See Sears Roebuck & Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 85 Cal. App. 3d 763, 149 Cal.
Rptr. 750 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (reversing decision of trial court and holding tax statute
unconstitutionally discriminatory under the commerce clause); Sears Roebuck & Co. v.
County of Los Angeles, 449 U.S. 1119 (1981) (The Supreme Court was equally divided with
Justice Stewart not participating so that the decision of the California Court of Appeals
invalidating the statute was summarily affirmed.); Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. County of Los
Angeles, 152 Cal. App. 3d 258, 199 Cal. Rptr. 440 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (The same district of
the California Court of Appeals that decided Sears Roebuck reversed its decision and held
that the statute was constitutional under the commerce clause.); Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. Los
Angeles, 42 Cal. 3d 1, 719 P.2d 897, 227 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1986) (Supreme Court of California
held that the statute does violate the commerce clause).
281. Sears Roebuck, 85 Cal. App. 3d at 775, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 758.
282. See Star-Kist Foods, 152 Cal. App. 3d at 260 n.1, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 441.
283. Id.




court simply concluded that the provision "provides no advantage
to local business; thus, we do not find the discriminatory effect
which would constitute a violation of the commerce clause.
'286
The Supreme Court of California, however, recently has de-
cided that the exemption from taxation provided under the Cali-
fornia law does violate the commerce clause.287 First, the court
pointed out that the additional protection from state taxation af-
forded foreign commerce did not mandate such an exemption. The
court then proceeded to identify the discrimination the exemption
created. According to the court, the provision was unconstitutional
because it discriminated against "a distinct class of interstate com-
merce" by exempting domestic corporations importing goods into
the United States while taxing those domestic corporations operat-
ing exclusively within the United States.288 The court thereby im-
plied that foreign commerce cannot be favored over interstate
commerce.
The courts' vacillation in determining whether a state tax may
favor foreign commerce over interstate commerce reveals the com-
plexity of this issue. On the one hand, it could be argued that the
California exemption is constitutional under the commerce clause
for the same reason that certain state tax incentive provisions are
valid. In other words, it is possible to view the statute as providing
a benefit to foreign commerce without burdening interstate com-
merce. As one commentator has pointed out, it is not clear that the
statute actually burdens interstate commerce so as to have an im-
pact on the flow or cost of goods remaining within interstate com-
merce.289 Nevertheless, as the California Supreme Court opinion
reveals, it is possible to view the statute as burdening interstate
commerce. By virtue of the exemption, the price of foreign goods
may be reduced below the price of comparable interstate goods,
thereby discouraging the transshipment of interstate goods.2 90 If
this is the case, then it would appear impossible to avoid the issue
whether the commerce clause prohibits preferential treatment of
foreign commerce over interstate commerce or only prohibits pref-
erential treatment of local commerce over either interstate or for-
291eign commerce.
286. Id.
287. Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. Los Angeles. 42 Cal. 3d 1, 719 P.2d 897, 227 Cal. Rptr.
391 (1986).
288. Id. at -, 719 P.2d at -, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 400.
289. See Case Note, supra note 3, at 836-40.
290. Id. at 837.
291. For a discussion of this issue, see infra notes 296-302 and accompanying text.
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VI. POSITIVE EFFECTS ON LOCAL COMMERCE
Once a court determines that a state tax subject to commerce
clause scrutiny causes disparate tax treatment that weighs against
a protected class of commerce, it then must determine whether the
tax statute benefits local commerce. Generally, when local com-
merce is involved, a negative effect on interstate or foreign com-
merce results in a benefit to competing local commerce. When the
disparity involves a distinction between interstate and foreign
commerce, however, then positive effects on intrastate commerce
will not necessarily exist. In such cases it may be unclear whether
the disparate tax treatment is unconstitutional.
A. Protected Commerce vs. Local Commerce
When disparate tax treatment burdens interstate and/or for-
eign commerce on the one hand and benefits intrastate commerce
on the other hand, then clearly there is unconstitutional discrimi-
nation under the commerce clause. Burdens on interstate or for-
eign commerce and benefits to local commerce often are flip sides
of the same coin. According to the Court in Bacchus Imports, Ltd.
v. Dias,
Virtually every discriminatory statute allocates benefits or burdens un-
equally; each can be viewed as conferring a benefit on one party and a detri-
ment on the other, in either an absolute or relative sense. The determination
of constitutionality does not depend upon whether one focuses upon the ben-
efited or the burdened party. A discrimination claim, by its nature, requires a
comparison of the two classifications, and it could always be said that there
was no intent to impose a burden on one party, but rather the intent was to
confer a benefit on the other.
2 92
Frequently, then, the Court describes unconstitutional dis-
crimination as a burden on interstate commerce with a resulting
benefit to intrastate commerce. In Northwestern States Portland
Cement Co. v. Minnesota293 the Court stated that no state may
"impose a tax which discriminates against interstate commerce
. . . by providing a direct commercial advantage to local busi-
ness." 294 Likewise, the Court in Boston Stock Exchange explained
that the New York transfer tax was invalid because it "creates
both an advantage for the exchanges in New York and a discrimi-
natory burden on commerce to its sister States.' 29 5 In short, dis-
292. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 273 (1984).
293. 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
294. Id. at 458.
295. 429 U.S. at 331; see also Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 466 U.S. at 399-401.
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crimination against interstate or foreign commerce in favor of in-
trastate commerce clearly is the inequity that the commerce clause
was designed to prevent.
B. Interstate Commerce vs. Foreign Commerce
It is unclear whether the commerce clause prohibits disparate
tax treatment between interstate and foreign commerce. Clearly,
foreign commerce is granted additional commerce clause protec-
tion.2 96 The question remains, however, whether this additional
protection afforded foreign commerce justifies a state tax, such as
the California ad valorem property statute discussed above 2 97 that
benefits foreign commerce at the expense of interstate
commerce.
298
On the one hand, it can be contended that a state should be
allowed to discriminate against interstate commerce in favor of for-
eign commerce. Arguably, disparity between interstate and foreign
commerce is not the evil that the commerce clause generally is
supposed to prevent. The commerce clause may be viewed as a
protection from local biases against either interstate or foreign
commerce. Thus, it can be concluded that not only negative effects
on protected commerce, but also positive effects on local commerce
are necessary to find a statute unconstitutional under the com-
merce clause. 9 Moreover, it can be said that the import-export
clause demonstrates a constitutional preference for foreign com-
merce over domestic commerce.300 Arguably, the Japan Line Court
implicitly approved such a preference. By holding that the Califor-
nia ad valorem property tax was unconstitutional only as applied
to instrumentalities of foreign commerce, Japan Line resulted in
disparate tax treatment between interstate and foreign com-
296. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
297. See supra notes 279-288 and accompanying text.
298. It is also unclear whether a state tax provision can favor interstate commerce over
foreign commerce. The additional protection afforded foreign commerce renders it unlikely
that such a provision would be held constitutional.
299. See P. HARTMAN, 1985 SuPPLEMENT, supra note 9, at 20. According to Professor
Hartman, "A tax is generally said by the Court to be discriminatory when the taxing State
provides a commercial advantage to local business at the expense of out-of-state business."
Id.; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8, Sears Roebuck and Co. v.
County of Los Angeles, 449 U.S. 1119 (1981).
300. See Brief for the United States, supra note 299, at 12. According to the Solicitor
General, "[T]he decisions of this Court involving imports, exports and foreign commerce
uniformly emphasize that one of the principal purposes of the Constitution was to assure




merce.301 Under this analysis, it can be concluded that the other
California ad valorem property tax statute discussed above which
provided an exemption in favor of foreign commerce over inter-
state commerce is constitutional because the statute did not pro-
vide benefits to local commerce."0 2
On the other hand, it can be argued that a state tax statute
that burdens interstate commerce should be held unconstitutional
regardless of the fact that it benefits foreign commerce instead of
local commerce. The prohibition of discrimination against inter-
state commerce always has been unqualified. Intuitively, the an-
tidiscrimination principle operates as a check on state legislators'
actions rather than as an inducement to action. Hence, the fact
that a statute benefits foreign commerce should not obscure the
fact that the statute burdens interstate commerce. Principle policy
concerns served by the commerce clause are the promotion of a
free trade unit among the states and noninterference by the states
with the foreign policy of the nation. Allowing the states to prefer
foreign commerce over interstate commerce conceivably could in-
terfere with both of these aims.
VII. EFFECTS OF OTHER LAWS
If a state tax statute subject to commerce clause scrutiny
causes disparate tax treatment that burdens protected commerce
and benefits local commerce, then the statute violates the com-
merce clause. This conclusion, however, may not necessitate invali-
dation of the state tax. It is possible that a federal statute may
alter the commerce clause result. Also, the twenty-first amendment
may override the commerce clause.
A. Congressional Consent to State Tax Discrimination
A conclusion that a state tax discriminates against interstate
commerce may not invalidate the statute if Congress legitimizes
the state action. The power of Congress over interstate commerce
includes the authority to consent to state taxes affecting such com-
merce. 0 Congressional consent to state taxes that otherwise would
301. See id. at 9. Of course the disparity between interstate and foreign commerce was
not addressed by the Court in Japan Line.
302. For a discussion of this statute, see supra notes 279-288 and accompanying text.
303. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (holding that state
unemployment tax applied to employers engaged in interstate commerce was valid because
Congress had provided that the employer should not be relieved of such taxes on the ground
that he is engaged in interstate commerce). According to the International Shoe Court, "It
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be unconstitutional under the commerce clause is most prominent
in the insurance tax field. In 1945 Congress enacted the McCarren-
Ferguson Act, which provides, "The business of insurance, and
every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the
several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such
business. ' 30 4 In Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin05 the Su-
preme Court held that a South Carolina statute that imposed a
three percent tax on the premiums of insurance policies written by
foreign insurance companies but that did not tax domestic insur-
ance companies was not unconstitutional under the commerce
clause because of congressional consent to such taxation in the Mc-
Carren-Ferguson Act. The McCarren-Ferguson Act also has been
interpreted as allowing state retaliatory taxes on the insurance
business that the commerce clause otherwise would prohibit.30a
Discriminatory state taxes on the insurance industry, however,
may be susceptible to challenge on equal protection grounds.3 07
B. The Interplay Between the Commerce Clause and the
Twenty-First Amendment
The twenty-first amendment grants the states the power to
enact laws regulating commerce involving intoxicating liquors. Ac-
cording to section two of the amendment, "The transportation or
importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United
States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in viola-
tion of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."308 By granting the
states power to regulate interstate commerce in intoxicating i-
quors while granting Congress the power to regulate interstate
commerce in general, the Constitution creates a potential conflict.
is no longer debatable that Congress, in the exercise of the commerce power, may authorize
the states, in specified ways, to regulate interstate commerce or impose burdens upon it."
Id. at 315.
304. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (1982).
305. 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
306. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648
(1981) (holding that retaliatory insurance taxes do not violate the commerce clause).
307. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 105 S. Ct. 1676 (1985) (holding that do-
mestic preference taxes on insurance premiums may violate the equal protection clause).
For a discussion of this case, see infra notes 333-38 and accompanying text. See also Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Dep't of Ins., 373 N.W.2d 399 (N.D. 1985) (holding
that North Dakota domestic preference tax on insurance premiums violated the equal pro-
tection clauses of the federal and state constitutions); State v. American Bankers Ins. Co.,
374 N.W.2d 609 (S.D. 1985) (holding that South Dakota tax provisions requiring unlicensed
and unauthorized out-of-state insurers to pay a higher premium tax than domestic insurers
violated equal protection clause).
308. U.S. CONsT., amend. XXI, § 2.
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The Supreme Court has faced the conflict between the twenty-
first amendment and the commerce clause with varying results.3 09
In State Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Co. 3 1 0 the Court
found the twenty-first amendment to be controlling and upheld a
California statute that imposed a license fee on the privilege of im-
porting beer to any place in California. The Court noted that the
fee would have been unconstitutional under the commerce clause
prior to enactment of the twenty-first amendment.3 11 Likewise, in
Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp.3" the Court held
that New York could not prevent the sale of liquor at in-state air-
ports for delivery to international airline travelers because the li-
quor was not destined for use in New York. According to the
Court, "[A] State is totally unconfined by traditional Commerce
Clause limitations when it restricts the importation of intoxicants
destined for use, distribution, or consumption within its
borders.
'3 13
Despite these cases, the Supreme Court recently has stated
that the twenty-first amendment "did not entirely remove state
regulation of alcoholic beverages from the ambit of the Commerce
Clause. 3 14 In Bacchus Imports the Court held that a Hawaii ex-
cise tax imposed on sales of liquor at wholesale that exempted cer-
tain locally produced beverages was unconstitutional. The Court
reasoned that the Hawaiian statute violated the fundamental tenet
of the commerce clause (promoting free trade among the states),
but did not further the primary purpose of the twenty-first amend-
ment (promoting temperance). 5 According to the Court, "State
laws that constitute mere economic protectionism are therefore not
entitled to the same deference as laws enacted to combat the per-
ceived evils of an unrestricted traffic in liquor.
'"3 1 6
Under Bacchus Imports it would appear unlikely that the
twenty-first amendment could be used to alter the result of finding
a state tax statute unconstitutional under the commerce clause.
Generally, any state tax statute that discriminates against inter-
309. See P. HARTMAN, 1985 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 9, § 2.19, at 43-58.
310. 299 U.S. 59 (1936).
311. Id. at 62.
312. 377 U.S. 324 (1964).
313. Id. at 330; see also Heublein, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 409 U.S. 275
(1972) (holding that South Carolina regulation requiring out-of-state liquor manufacturers
to do more than solicit sales in the state so as to render them susceptible to the state income
tax does not violate the commerce clause).
314. Bacchus Imports, 468 U.S. at 275.
315. Id. at 275-76.
316. Id. at 276.
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state commerce "constitute[s] mere economic protectionism" so
that the Supreme Court would not view the twenty-first amend-
ment controlling. The Bacchus Imports decision has been criti-
cized, however. A vigorous dissent pointed out that the decision
flies in the face of the Court's previous decisions involving the
twenty-first amendment. According to the dissent, the majority's
approach of looking at central purposes of the constitutional provi-
sions was not only novel, but inapposite.31 7 In addition, Professor
Hartman has pointed out that the majority opinion is inconsistent
with previous decisions. He suggests that Bacchus may have
"sapped the objective vitality of the Twenty-First Amendment."3 18
VIII. COMPARISON OF OTHER RESTRAINTS AGAINST STATE TAX
DISCRIMINATION
Although the commerce clause may be viewed as the most sig-
nificant protection against discriminatory state taxes, other sources
of protection may prove to be at least as important in certain
cases. In addition to other federal constitutional provisions, various
federal statutory and state constitutional provisions commonly are
invoked as restraints against state tax discrimination. The discus-
sion below briefly describes the salient features of these alternative
protections and compares their application to that of the com-
merce clause.
A. Federal Constitutional Provisions
Apart from the commerce clause, the equal protection clause
and the privileges and immunities clause are the most common
federal constitutional provisions that taxpayers invoke to challenge
allegedly discriminatory state taxes. 19 The potential application of
other provisions, however, should not be overlooked. Indeed, these
other provisions may be particularly useful in certain situations.
1. Equal Protection Clause
The equal protection clause provides that no state "shall deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws. ' 's3° Initially, it is interesting to compare the scope of pro-
317. Id. at 278-87 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
318. P. HARTMAN, 1985 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 9, § 2.19, at 57.
319. See Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648,
655-56 (1981) (insurance company without commerce clause or privileges and immunities
clause protection challenged California "retaliatory" tax under equal protection clause).
320. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1.
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tected taxpayers under the commerce clause and the equal protec-
tion clause. Both provisions may generally be invoked to challenge
corporate taxes. It is well settled that a corporation is considered a
"person" within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment.32 1 The
equal protection clause, however, may be the strongest constitu-
tional barrier to discriminatory entrance fees, because the com-
merce clause affords little protection to foreign corporations seek-
ing to enter a state to conduct an intrastate business.
3 22
Although the equal protection clause and the commerce clause
both protect against discriminatory state taxation, there are some
fundamental differences between these protections. Challenges to
state tax discrimination under the commerce clause usually are
more successful than challenges under the equal protection clause.
The commerce clause unconditionally forbids state tax discrimina-
tion against interstate or foreign commerce. In contrast, the valid-
ity of a state tax statute under the equal protection clause gener-
ally will be determined under the same standard of rationality
traditionally applied in evaluating other forms of state economic
and commercial regulations. Under this rational basis test, a stat-
ute will be sustained if the state legislature reasonably could have
concluded that the challenged classification would promote a legiti-
mate state purpose.32 3 If the purpose of a particular state tax is
legitimate, an equal protection challenge will not prevail as long as
the rational relationship question is at least debatable.2
In structuring internal taxation schemes, "the States have
large leeway in making classifications and drawing lines which in
321. Western & Southern Life Ins., 451 U.S. at 660-61 (holding a corporation to be a
"person" entitled to equal protection); Southern Ry. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400, 412 (1910)
(holding that foreign corporation doing business in the state is a "person" entitled to equal
protection of the laws).
322. See Atlantic Refining Co. v. Virginia, 302 U.S. 22 (1937) (holding that the com-
merce clause does not protect a foreign corporation from entrance fees); see also J. HELtER-
STEIN, supra note 191, at 125. For a discussion of the constitutionality of entrance fees, see
P. HARTMAN, supra note 17, § 11.3.
323. Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 195-96 (1983) (holding Alabama severance
tax prohibiting tax pass-through and exempting royalty owners valid). State taxes that ad-
versely affect a fundamental interest or contain a classification based on a suspect criterion
may be subject to stricter judicial scrutiny.
324. Western & Southern Life Ins., 451 U.S. at 674 (tax valid if legislature "rationally
could have believed" tax would serve its objective); see also Regan v. Taxation with Repre-
sentation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 547-48 (1983) (noting legislature's "especially broad
latitude" in creating tax classifications); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411




their judgment produce reasonable systems of taxation. 32 5 Thus,
when the public interest is served, a state may tax one business
but not another in order to promote the one or to restrict or sup-
press the other.32 Furthermore, a state "may impose different spe-
cific taxes upon different trades and professions and may vary the
rate of excise upon various products. 3 2 7 A state need not "resort
to close distinctions or to maintain a precise, scientific uniformity
with reference to composition, use or value.
3 28
Although state tax statutes are not often invalidated on equal
protection grounds, statutes that seek to benefit domestic industry
by discriminating against foreign competitors have been struck
down.32 9 In this regard there may be some overlap between com-
merce clause and equal protection clause protection. The focuses of
these two constitutional provisions, however, are different. The
commerce clause is designed to protect commerce and to promote
free trade among the states; it is not concerned with the treatment
of individual taxpayers. The equal protection clause, on the other
hand, protects individual taxpayer groups. Thus, statutes that dis-
criminate against nonresidents are especially vulnerable to invali-
dation under the equal protection clause rather than the commerce
clause. In a recent decision, Hooper v. Bernalillo County As-
sessor,330 the Court invalidated a state property tax exemption lim-
ited to Vietnam veterans who had resided in the state prior to a
certain date. The Court reasoned that the residency requirement
bore no rational relationship to the state's asserted objectives.
The Court has indicated that it will examine the state's pur-
pose in enacting a statute that is challenged under the equal pro-
tection clause as discriminating against out-of-state interests.
325. Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 359 (1973) (Illinois prop-
erty tax classifying corporations differently from individuals held reasonable).
326. Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 512 (1937) (upholding
Alabama act exempting particular classes of employers).
327. Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (1959) (upholding Ohio's
property tax exemption for nonresidents' goods held in Ohio warehouses).
328. Id.
329. See, e.g., WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 U.S. 117, 119 (1968) ("[W]hile a State
may impose conditions on the entry of foreign corporations to do business in the State, once
it has permitted them to enter, the adopted corporations are entitled to equal protection
with the state's own corporate progeny."); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562,
571-72 (1949) ("[A]s to taxation of intangibles. . . the federal right of a nonresident is the
right to equal treatment."); Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494, 511 (1926)
("[T]he foreign corporation stands equal, and is to be classified with domestic corporations
of the same kind."); Southern Ry. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400, 417 (1910) (franchise tax not
imposed upon domestic corporations).
330. 105 S. Ct. 2862 (1985).
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Under equal protection analysis, as opposed to commerce clause
analysis, a legitimate state purpose for the disparate tax treatment
may save the statute. For example, in Western & Southern Life
Insurance Co. v. State Board of Equalization"33 the Court sus-
tained California's retaliatory insurance tax that discriminated
against out-of-state insurers whose home states imposed higher
premium taxes than California. The Court reasoned that Califor-
nia's legitimate purpose of promoting the interstate business of its
domestic insurers by deterring other states from enacting excessive
taxes satisfied equal protection requirements. 2
In a more recent decision, Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v.
Ward,3 3 the Court held that certain state goals did not justify Ala-
bama's higher gross premiums tax on foreign insurers. The Metro-
politan Life Court distinguished Western & Southern Life Insur-
ance Co. on the ground that the Alabama statute was designed
only to promote domestic insurance industry at the expense of out-
of-state insurers, whereas California's purpose was to influence the
taxing policies of other states. 4 The Court's holding indicates that
under the equal protection clause, states may not discriminate in
their taxing schemes against foreign corporations solely because
they are nonresidents.
The Alabama statute's discrimination against out-of-state
businesses clearly violates the commerce clause. The McCarren-
Ferguson Act, however, removed the commerce clause barrier to
state taxation of the insurance industry.33 5 In rejecting the argu-
ment that this statute also immunized the Alabama tax from an
equal protection clause challenge, the Court reasoned that "[t]he
two constitutional provisions perform different functions in the
analysis of the permissible scope of a State's power-one protects
interstate commerce, and the other protects persons from uncon-
stitutional discrimination by the States. 33 6 The Court determined
that "[e]qual protection restraints are applicable even though the
effect of the discrimination in this case is similar to the type of
burden with which the Commerce Clause also would be con-
cerned. 33 7 The Court's reasoning highlights the fundamental dif-
331. 451 U.S. 648 (1981).
332. Id. at 674.
333. 105 S. Ct. 1676 (1985).
334. Id. at 1681.
335. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982); see Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 451 U.S. at
655.




ference between the two constitutional provisions:
The Commerce Clause, unlike the Equal Protection Clause, is integrally con-
cerned with whether a state purpose implicates local or national interests.
The Equal Protection Clause, in contrast, is concerned with whether a state
purpose is impermissibly discriminatory; whether the discrimination involves
local or other interests is not central to the inquiry to be made. Thus, the fact
that promotion of local industry is a legitimate state interest in the Com-
merce Clause context says nothing about its validity under equal protection
analysis.
3 38
The Court may be more lenient with respect to taxes that dis-
criminate against residents. In these cases the commerce clause af-
fords no protection, and the equal protection clause affords only
limited protection. Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers 9 involved
a statute designed to encourage foreign companies to build ware-
houses in Ohio. The Court upheld the statute against a challenge
by a domestic merchandiser on equal protection grounds. The dis-
criminatory tax involved did not favor residents by burdening out-
siders, but granted the nonresident an exemption that residents
did not share. Further, because the foreign and domestic compa-
nies involved were not competing to provide warehousing services,
granting the former an exemption did not adversely affect the do-
mestic companies subject to tax.
2. Privileges and Immunities Clause
The privileges and immunities clause provides: "The Citizens
of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of
Citizens in the several States."' 4 ° As opposed to the commerce
clause, which provides protection to both individuals and corpora-
tions, corporations are not "citizens" protected by the privileges
and immunities clause.341 For purposes of analyzing a taxing
scheme under the privileges and immunities clause, the terms "cit-
izen" and "resident" are essentially interchangeable. 42 Thus, "a
general taxing scheme . . . if it discriminates against all non-resi-
dents, has the necessary effect of including in the discrimination
338. Id. at 1681 n.6.
339. 358 U.S. 522 (1959).
340. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. The Fourteenth Amendment also contains a clause
protecting the privileges and immunities of citizens. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. This pro-
vision, however, does not provide any protection against discriminatory state and local taxa-
tion. See P. HARTMAN, supra note 17, § 4.1.
341. Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537, 548-550 (1928) (corporations not protected by
privileges and immunities clause).
342. Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 662 n.8 (1975) (New Hampshire's income
tax on nonresidents' in-state income held invalid).
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those who are citizens of other States."34 3
Whereas the commerce clause primarily protects businesses
operating in more than one state, the central concern of the privi-
leges and immunities clause is to assure fair treatment of citizens
of other states.3 44 In Toomer v. Witsel13 45 the Court invalidated a
statute that required nonresident shrimp fishermen to pay an an-
nual license fee of twenty-five hundred dollars per boat to fish in
South Carolina's coastal waters, because residents were required to
pay only twenty-five dollars per boat. In a concurring opinion Jus-
tice Frankfurter3 46 argued that the South Carolina tax scheme did
not violate the privileges and immunities clause because the state
could reserve the shrimp for capture and consumption by its own
citizens. Rather, because the state sought to reserve for its own
residents the business of exporting shrimp in interstate commerce,
Justice Frankfurter believed that the South Carolina statute vio-
lated the commerce clause. The significance of the majority's deci-
sion to rest the decision on the privileges and immunities clause,
then, was that the state was required to treat nonresident fisher-
men equally with South Carolina fishermen, whether they operated
in interstate commerce or restricted their business activity to
catching and selling shrimp entirely within South Carolina's
borders.
The privileges and immunities clause also protects a com-
muter who engages in intrastate commerce in a neighboring state
from that state's discrimination in favor of its own residents. 7 In
Austin v. New Hampshire4 the Supreme Court held that a New
Hampshire commuters income tax, which did not apply to resi-
dents, violated the privileges and immunities of Maine residents
who worked in New Hampshire. The Court rejected New Hamp-
shire's argument that because of the credit granted under Maine
income tax law for income taxes paid to other states, there was no
actual discrimination.
The Toomer Court observed that the privileges and immuni-
ties clause, like many other constitutional provisions, is not an ab-
343. Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 79 (1920) (New York income tax
favoring residents over nonresidents held invalid).
344. Varat, supra note 87, at 499.
345. 334 U.S. 385 (1948); see also Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415 (1952) (higher
license fee on nonresident than on resident fisherman held to violate the privileges and im-
munities clause).
346. Toomer, 334 U.S. at 408-09 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
347. Varat, supra note 87, at 500-01.
348. 420 U.S. 656 (1975).
950 [Vol. 39:879
STATE TAX DISCRIMINATION
solute bar to differential treatment of residents and nonresidents.
The privileges and immunities clause requires only that the state
treat residents and nonresidents without unnecessary distinctions
when a nonresident seeks to engage in an essential activity or exer-
cise a basic right. It bars discrimination against citizens of other
states only when there is no substantial reason for the discrimina-
tion beyond the fact that the taxpayers are citizens of other
states.349 Thus, the inquiry in each case is whether valid reasons
exist for disparate tax treatment and whether the degree of dis-
crimination bears a close relation to the justifications. In making
this inquiry, courts are inclined to respect the principle that
"[s]tates should have considerable leeway in analyzing local evils
and in prescribing appropriate cures.
'3 50
In Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission of Montana51 the
Court held that the privileges and immunities clause did not pre-
vent Montana from imposing on nonresidents a hunting license fee
at least 7.5 times as great as the fee charged residents because rec-
reational elk hunting was not a fundamental right.3 52 The Court, in
thus limiting the applicability of the privileges and immunities
clause, reasoned that the affected right did not bear "upon the vi-
tality of the Nation as a single entity."3 3 Thus, the state was
merely required to justify the discrimination under the minimum
rationality standard of review of the equal protection clause. In the
view of one Supreme Court Justice, this standard allows a state to
draw any distinction based on residence that is not totally
arbitrary.3
5 4
3. Due Process Clause
The due process clause provides: "No State shall . . . deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
.... 11355 A taxpayer typically will not raise a due process chal-
lenge to an allegedly discriminatory state tax because the principal
349. Even a discriminatory statute will be upheld if the nonresidents "constitute a
peculiar source of the evil at which the statute is aimed" and there is a "reasonable relation-
ship" between that evil and the statutory discrimination against nonresidents. Hicklin v.
Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 525-526 (1978) (holding Alaskan statute absolutely preferring resi-
dents over nonresidents for certain jobs to violate the privileges and immunities clause).
350. See Toomer, 334 U.S. at 396.
351. 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
352. Id. at 388.
353. Id. at 383.
354. See id. at 402-05 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
355. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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focus of the due process clause is jurisdiction to tax rather than
fairness. Although due process challenges to state apportionment
formulas might be viewed as involving claims of "discrimination,"
this Article rejects this view. Instead, we view discrimination as in-
volving disparate tax treatment by one state between two taxpay-
ers, whereas apportionment issues involve the taxation of one tax-
payer by two or more states.3 58 Moreover, the significance of the
due process clause in regard to state tax issues other than the ju-
risdiction to tax is diminished because many due process chal-
lenges to a tax will be subsumed under other constitutional
arguments.5
7
The due process clause places two restrictions on the power of
states to tax income: first, there must be some "minimal connec-
tion" or definite link between the income generating activities and
the taxing state; second, the income sought to be taxed must be
reasonably related to the activities in the state.3 58 These require-
ments of the due process clause overlap the commerce clause re-
quirements of substantial nexus, fair apportionment, and fair rela-
tion to the services provided by the state. 59  The nexus
requirement necessitates a showing that the taxpayer conducted
activities in the state that gave rise to the taxable income.3, 0 The
requirement of a reasonable relationship between the income
sought to be taxed and the taxpayer's activities in the taxing state
is essentially a measurement problem.'
356. See supra notes 215-25 and accompanying text.
357. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 470 n.12 (1981)
(validity of statute under equal protection clause precludes due process challenge); Western
& Southern Life Ins. Co., 451 U.S. at 656 n.7 (1980) (any due process argument is subsumed
in the equal protection issue).
358. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, 445 U.S. 425, 436-37
(1980) (upholding income taxation of dividends from unitary foreign subsidiaries).
359. J. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 10, 1 4.8.
360. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959)
(maintenance in a state of sales office that supports salesmen who solicit orders in the state,
subject to acceptance and processing outside the state, is sufficient contact).
Apportionment of income that is not part of a unitary business carried on in a state is
invalid under the due process clause. ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S.
307 (1982) (apportioning intangible income of subsidiary not connected with taxpayer's in-
state operations held invalid); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep't, 458 U.S.
354 (1982) (same); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes of Vermont, 445 U.S. 425
(1980).
Federal law also limits the states' power to tax multijurisdictional corporations. 15
U.S.C. § 381 (1982).
361. Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Missouri State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317 (1968) (due
process violation found in the application of single-factor apportionment formula to a par-




The import-export clause provides: "No State shall, without
the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports
or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing
its inspection Laws .... "1362 The import-export clause thus con-
tains an explicit limitation on the taxing powers of the states, in
contrast to the commerce clause, which is a grant to Congress of
the power to regulate commerce. The commerce clause restrictions
on the states' taxing power are derived from the implication of
congressional silence. Thus, Congress may remove all commerce
clause restrictions by acquiescing to state taxing schemes,"'3 but no
comparable power is granted to Congress under the import-export
clause. Congress must consent to particular state duties on imports
or exports (except for those that may be absolutely necessary for
executing the state's inspection laws), and the net produce of such
duties and imposts must be for the use of the United States
Treasury.
36 4
Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages3 6 5 changed the focus of atten-
tion of the import-export clause cases from the nature of the taxed
goods to the nature of the tax at issue. Prior to Michelin Tire the
basic legal principle used to determine whether state exactions on
imported goods were constitutionally permissible was the "original
package" doctrine.366 The Michelin Tire Court held that a state's
ment); Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1931) (there may be a consti-
tutional problem with a State's apportionment formula when 15% of income had source in
state but 83% taxed). But see Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978) (single-factor
formulas upheld when taxpayer merely relied on general claims of burden and possible
double taxation).
362. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
363. See supra notes 303-07 and accompanying text.
364. J. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 10, 5.1.
365. 423 U.S. 276 (1976) (Georgia's assessment of a nondiscriminatory ad valorem
property tax against imported goods that were no longer in import transit did not violate
import-export clause, regardless of whether the goods had lost their status as imports by
being mingled with other goods of importer).
366. Low v. Austin, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 29 (1871) (states prohibited by import-export
clause from imposing a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax on imported goods until
they have lost their character as imports and have become incorporated into the mass of
property in the state). The Austin decision was based on the language of Chief Justice Mar-
shall in Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 441-42 (1827):
It is sufficient for the present to say, generally, that when the importer has so acted
upon the thing imported, that it has become incorporated and mixed up with the mass
of property in the country, it has, perhaps, lost its distinctive character as an import,
and has become subject to the taxing power of the State; but while remaining the prop-
erty of the importer, in his warehouse, in the original form or package in which it was
imported, a tax upon it is too plainly a duty on imports to escape the prohibition in the
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nondiscriminatory ad valorem personal property tax was not the
type of exaction that the framers of the Constitution considered as
being an "impost" or "duty" and that such a tax was therefore not
within the prohibition of the import-export clause. Instead, the im-
port-export clause was designed to prohibit "discriminatory state
taxation against imported goods as imports" and "transit fees on
the privilege of moving [imports] through a state.
'3 67
In the wake of its Michelin Tire decision, the Court in De-
partment of Revenue of Washington v. Association of Washington
Stevedoring Cos.s6s upheld the State of Washington's business ac-
tivities tax, measured by gross receipts, as applied to stevedoring
that included the handling of goods destined for foreign commerce.
Moreover, in Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Co.369 the Court reiter-
ated its abandonment of the "original package" doctrine, expressly
overruling its 1945 decision involving the same parties.
70
5. Supremacy Clause
The supremacy clause provides: "This Constitution, and the
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land ... any Thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding. ' . 71 Under the supremacy clause a
state tax statute that conflicts with a federal statute is unconstitu-
tional.37 2 Federal law may restrict state taxation of various aspects
of interstate or foreign commerce. Thus, a state statute may be
struck down under the supremacy clause as imposing undue bur-
dens on interstate or foreign commerce. In Aloha Airlines, Inc. v.
Director of Taxation of Hawaiis7 s the Court invalidated a Hawaii
gross receipts tax imposed on airlines, finding it preempted by the
Airport Development Acceleration Act of 1973.17" The Court rea-
constitution.
367. Michelin Tire, 423 U.S. at 286, 290.
368. 435 U.S. 734 (1978).
369. 466 U.S. 353 (1984).
370. The 1945 decision, Hoover & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945), held that
the import-export clause barred Ohio's nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax on im-
ported goods stored in their original packages awaiting use in manufacturing.
371. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, cl. 2.
372. Examples of cases involving overriding federal law are discussed infra notes 394-
97 and accompanying text.
373. 464 U.S. 7 (1983).
374. 49 U.S.C. § 1513(a) (1976) (legislation prior to 1982 amendment that added §
1513(d)). For cases construing § 1513(d) of the Airport Development Acceleration Act, see
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soned: "[W]hen a federal statute unambiguously forbids the States
to impose a particular kind of tax on an industry affecting inter-
state commerce, courts need not look beyond the plain language of
the federal statute to determine whether a state statute that im-
poses such a tax is preempted.
'37 5
Moreover, the supremacy clause extends beyond taxes that
Congress has.expressly prohibited or that are in direct conflict with
federal law. State action that frustrates the purposes and objec-
tives of federal law likewise violates the supremacy clause.37 ' For
example, in McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corp.3 77 the Court held that a
New York City sales tax imposed on sales of fuel oil to vessels en-
gaged in foreign commerce was an infringement of congressional
regulation of foreign commerce. In the recent case of Wardair
Canada, Inc. v. Florida Department of Revenue a'M however, the
Court held that Florida's tax on aviation fuel used by foreign air-
lines in foreign air commerce did not violate the supremacy clause
because there was no indication that Congress in enacting the Fed-
eral Aviation Act intended to preclude state sales taxation of air-
line fuel. 
3 7
Some state and local taxes have been held to be preempted by
the federal ERISA statute.380 Moreover, in Exxon Corp. v. Hunts81
the Supreme Court held that federal Superfund legislation 382 pre-
empted portions of New Jersey's spill fund tax. a33
Under the supremacy clause states may not impose taxes
whose legal incidence falls on the federal government, regardless of
infra note 397.
375. 464 U.S. at 13.
376. J. HELLERSTEIN, 1985 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 117, 1 4.13[B], at 840; see Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
377. 309 U.S. 414 (1940).
378. 106 S. Ct. 2369 (1986).
379. Id.
380. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-104 to -106 (1982); see, e.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Roemer,
603 F. Supp. 7 (D. Minn. 1984) (tax lien against monthly pension payments); General Mo-
tors Corp. v. California State Bd. of Equalization, 600 F. Supp. 76 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (insur-
ance franchise tax using benefit plan payments as a means for measuring taxable insurance
premiums); National Carriers' Conference Comm. v. Heffernan, 454 F. Supp. 914 (D. Conn.
1978) (Connecticut tax against benefits paid from ERISA-covered plan). But see Firestone
Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bodle, (N.D. Ohio Aug. 1, 1985) (municipal income tax on employees
income may include amounts contributed to ERISA-covered plan).
381. 106 S. Ct. 1103 (1986).
382. 42 U.S.C. § 9614 (1984), part of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) Pub. L. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2795.
383. New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:10-23.11
to 58:10-23.11z (West 1982 & Supp. 1985).
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whether the tax discriminates against the federal government.3 8 '
States, however, may impose taxes whose economic burden falls on
the federal government.3 8 5 Nevertheless, states may not impose
taxes that discriminate against the federal government or its in-
strumentalities, nor may states discriminate against those who deal
with the federal government or its instrumentalities.3 6
In Washington v. United States387 the Court held that be-
cause Washington's sales tax rate for federal and nonfederal con-
tracts was the same and because the tax base was computed in a
manner favorable to federal contractors, the tax did not discrimi-
nate against federal contractors. The test of discrimination as for-
mulated in Washington v. United States is the economic burden
of the tax and not the legal incidence. Thus, if the economic bur-
den of the tax is no greater on transactions with the federal gov-
ernment than it is on comparable transactions in the private sec-
tor, the tax does not violate federal government immunity even
though the legal incidence of the tax may fall differently on those
who do business with the government and those who engage in pri-
vate transactions.88 One commentator has observed that the alleg-
edly discriminatory tax on federal contractors in Washington v.
United States was saved by the "complementary" exaction on pri-
vate contractors." 9
6. First Amendment
The first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law
...abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. 3 90 The first
amendment prohibition encompasses discrimination against the
press in the form of state taxes.3 91 Furthermore, state income tax
384. Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 (1954) (Arkansas gross receipts tax
unconstitutional as applied against contractor acting as purchasing agent for federal
government).
385. United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720 (1982) (holding that contractors as
independent tax entities were not protected from state taxes by the supremacy clause); Ala-
bama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941) (upholding application of state sales tax applied
against contractor performing cost-plus building contract for federal government).
386. See, e.g., Phillips Chem. Co. v. Dumas Indep. School Dist., 361 U.S. 376 (1960)
(lessees of federally owned property taxed more heavily than lessees of state owned
property).
387. 460 U.S. 536 (1983).
388. Warren, Federal Immunity from State Sales Taxes, in NYU SECOND ANNUAL IN-
sTrrUTE STATE & LOCAL TAXATION at 9-12 (1984).
389. W. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 167, at 423-25.
390. U.S. CONsT. amend. I. The first amendment has been held applicable to the states
by reason of the fourteenth amendment.
391. See Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460
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laws that grant tax benefits to parents of children attending paro-
chial schools have come under attack as violating the first amend-
ment establishment clause.s 2
B. Federal Statutory Restrictions Against State Tax
Discrimination
Unlike commerce clause protection, which generally protects
all forms of interstate commerce, federal statutory restrictions
against state tax discrimination usually have been aimed at pro-
tecting taxpayers engaged in specified businesses. A number of
state tax statutes have been found to violate the provisions of the
Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4-R
Act)," 3 which prohibits state tax discrimination against railroads.
Many of the cases construing these provisions have involved dis-
putes over the showing required of the railroad company to prove a
statutory violation (for example, that its property has been as-
sessed at a higher ratio to its true market value than other com-
U.S. 575 (1983) (use tax imposed on paper and ink products used by certain newspapers was
discriminatory against such publications); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233
(1936) (thirteen large metropolitan newspapers were subject to a two percent license tax on
gross receipts derived from advertising; at least 124 Louisiana newspapers paid no such tax
because the tax applied only if a newspaper's weekly circulation exceeded 20,000). But see
Chicago Tribune Co. v. Johnson, 119 Il. App. 3d 270, 456 N.E.2d 356 (1983), afl'd, 106 Ill.
2d 63, 477 N.E.2d 482, appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 241 (1985) (rejecting claim that practice
of granting manufacturers, but not the newspaper publisher, an exemption from a state use
tax on machinery violated first amendment).
392. But see Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (sustaining Minnesota income tax
provision that allowed a deduction for the costs of dependent students attending public or
private elementary or secondary schools).
393. The operative provision of the 4-R Act, 49 U.S.C. § 11503 (1982), provides:
The following acts unreasonably burden and discriminate against interstate commerce,
and a State, subdivision of a State, or authority acting for a State or subdivision of a
State may not do any of them:
(1) assess rail transportation property at a value that has a higher ratio to the true
market value of the rail transportation property than the ratio that the assessed value
of other commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction has to
the true market value of the other commercial and industrial property.
(2) levy or collect a tax on an assessment that may not be made under clause (1) of
this subsection.
(3) levy or collect an ad valorem property tax on rail transportation property at a
tax rate that exceeds the tax rate applicable to commercial and industrial property in
the same assessment jurisdiction.
(4) impose another tax that discriminates against a rail carrier providing transpor-
tation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission under subchapter I of chapter 105
of this title.
49 U.S.C. § 11503(b). See generally Benshoof, Trial of a Tax Discrimination Case Under
the 4-R Act, NYU SECOND ANNUAL INsTITUTE STATE & LOCAL TAXATION § 20 (1984).
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mercial and industrial property in the jurisdiction).,' Other cases
in federal and state courts have focused on the scope of a separate
prohibition against nonproperty taxes that discriminate against
railroads.3 95
Federal statutes patterned after the 4-R Act protect motor
39 6
and air3 97 carriers against discriminatory state property taxes.
Moreover, legislation now pending in Congress s98 similarly would
limit the power of states to impose ad valorem taxes on interstate
natural gas transmission property. Additional federal statutes pro-
hibit discrimination against other types of taxpayers.3 9
394. See, e.g., Burlington N.R.R. v. Bair, 766 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir. 1985) (higher prop-
erty tax rate applied to railroad property); Clinchfield R.R. Co. v. Lynch, 700 F.2d 126 (4th
Cir. 1983) (railroad property value reassessed more frequently than other real property);
Trailer Train v. State Bd. of Equalization, 697 F.2d 860 (9th Cir.) (higher property tax rate
applied to railroad property), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 846, (1983); Arizona v. Atchison, T. & S.
F. Ry., (9th Cir. 1983) (unreported), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1084 (1984); Burlington N.R.R. v.
Lennen, 715 F.2d 494 (10th Cir. 1983) (no statutory remedy for challenge of valuation
method), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1230, (1984); Burlington N.R.R. v. Department of Revenue
of Wisconsin, 604 F. Supp. 1575 (W.D. Wis. 1985) (railroad property assessed at higher rate
than other property).
395. See, e.g., Richmond, F. & P. R.R. v. Department of Tax'n, 762 F.2d 375, 379 (4th
Cir. 1985) (statute, "on its face, clearly and unambiguously prohibits all forms of discrimina-
tory taxation of railroads"); Trailer Train v. Bair, 765 F.2d 744 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 572 (1985) (Iowa railroad mileage tax on loaded train cars traveling through the
state); Alabama Great S. R.R. v. Eagerton, 663 F.2d 1036 (11th Cir. 1981) (Alabama
franchise tax on railroads measured by gross receipts from intrastate business); Kansas City
S. Ry. v. McNamara, 563 F. Supp. 199 (M.D. La. 1983) (Louisiana gross receipts tax levied
upon public utilities, including railroads); Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Bair, 338 N.W.2d 338
(Iowa 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1071 (1984) (Iowa special excise tax on railroads mea-
sured by amount of fuel consumption in state).
396. 49 U.S.C. § 11503a (1982) (prohibiting property tax discrimination against motor
carriers). See Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. v. Lynch, 723 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1983)
(requiring equal treatment of motor carrier and other property); Arkansas-Best Freight Sys-
tem, Inc. v. Cochran, 546 F. Supp. 915 (M.D. Tenn. 1982) (prohibiting discrimination
against motor carriers in valuation methods).
397. 49 U.S.C. § 1513(d) (1982) (prohibiting property tax discrimination against air
carriers). See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. State, 358 N.W.2d 515 (N.D. 1984) (holding state's
airline flight property tax preempted by § 1513(d)); Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Hughes
County, S.D., 372 N.W.2d 106 (S.D. 1985), prob. juris. noted, 106 S. Ct. 1180 (1986) (state
tax upheld); see generally Note, Discriminatory Demands and Divided Decisions: State
and Local Taxation of Rail, Motor, and Air Carrier Property, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1107 (1986).
398. H.R. REP. No. 99-121, Part I, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
399. 15 U.S.C. § 391 (1982) (discrimination against out-of-state purchases of electric-
ity); 12 U.S.C. § 548 (1982) (discrimination against national banks); 12 U.S.C. § 1464(h)
(1982) (discrimination against federal savings and loan associations).
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C. State Constitutional Provisions
Provisions of the constitution of every state except Connecti-
cut and New York require taxes to be uniform and/or equal. 00
Some "[s]tate constitutions require taxes to be both 'equal' and
'uniform,' or 'proportional' and 'uniform,' while others require only
'uniformity.' ,,4o1 Other states require uniformity only within the
classes of persons or property taxed.0 2 These state uniformity pro-
visions can be used to challenge disparate tax treatment by a state.
Unlike the commerce clause, state uniformity provisions do
not focus on discrimination against interstate commerce. Instead,
these provisions often are applied using the same standard applied
under the equal protection clause.40 3 Alternatively, some state
courts have developed other standards.'0 ' Some uniformity re-
quirements have been held not to apply to all types of state or
local taxes. Generally, uniformity requirements are applicable to
ad valorem property taxes. Hence, the uniformity provisions may
provide protection against state tax discrimination that the com-
merce clause, which does not apply to ad valorem property taxes,
generally does not reach.0 5
IX. CONCLUSION
This Article presents an analytical approach to state tax dis-
crimination under the commerce clause. Under this approach one
400. J. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 10, % 2.1; W. NEWHOUSE, CONSTITUTIONAL UNIFORMITY
AND EQUALITY IN STATE TAXATIoN (2d ed. 1984).
401. J. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 10, 2.1. Similarly, while some state constitutions
require uniformity in the "rate" of taxation, others impose this requirement with respect to
the rule of taxation. See 71 AM. Ju. 2D State & Local Taxation § 159 (1973).
402. See, e.g., Sperry Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 695 S.W.2d 464 (Mo. 1985) (dispar-
ity in ratio of assessed value to true value between class comprised of real property and class
comprised of tangible personal property not a violation of uniformity provision of Missouri
constitution because disparity in valuations not on the same class of subjects, but between
constitutionally established classes of property).
403. See, e.g., State ex. rel. Tomasic v. Kansas City, 237 Kan. 572, 701 P.2d 1314
(Kan. 1985) (uniformity provision held "substantially identical" to equal protection princi-
ples). For a discussion of the standard under the equal protection clause, see supra notes
323-39 and accompanying text.
404. See, e.g., Teter v. Clark County, 104 Wash. 2d 227, 704 P.2d 1171 (1985) (if taxa-
tion scheme is administered in systematic, nondiscriminatory manner, it meets requirements
of the State of Washington's constitutional uniformity requirement).
405. See Colorado Dep't of Social Servs. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 697 P.2d 1
(Colo. 1985) (Colorado constitution's uniformity provision applies only to ad valorem prop-
erty taxes); Belcher Oil Co. v. Dade County, 271 So. 2d 118 (Fla. 1972) (constitutional re-
quirements of equality and uniformity in taxation not applicable to excise taxes). For a
discussion of the scope of commerce clause protection, see supra notes 51-55 and accompa-
nying text.
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can determine whether a particular state tax unconstitutionally
discriminates against interstate or foreign commerce by investigat-
ing the following six questions: (1) Is the state tax subject to com-
merce clause scrutiny? (2) Is there disparate tax treatment? (3) Is
the inequality being challenged caused by the state tax statute? (4)
Does the unequal treatment weigh against a protected class of
commerce? (5) Does the unequal treatment weigh in favor of local
commerce? and (6) Can any other law alter the result under the
commerce clause?
The analytical approach developed in this Article is merely a
starting point in the development of a complete framework for an-
alyzing state tax discrimination under the commerce clause. Fur-
ther study will, no doubt, suggest additional points, possible dele-
tions, and alterations that should be made to the approach set
forth here. Perhaps additional questions will have to be added to
the six questions developed in this Article to analyze new issues
involving state tax discrimination under the commerce clause.
State tax discrimination under the commerce clause is a very com-
plex concept, and any analytical approach to it will have to evolve
along with the law on the subject.
Nonetheless, this Article should provide some guidance for
state tax practitioners attempting to determine if a particular state
tax provision discriminates against interstate or foreign commeice
in violation of the commerce clause. After answering the six ques-
tions, the state tax practitioner should have a good idea whether
the provision is unconstitutionally discriminatory under the com-
merce clause. It must be remembered, however, that other laws,
including other constitutional provisions, may prohibit certain
state tax discrimination. Thus, an analysis of state tax discrimina-
tion should begin, but not end, with the commerce clause inquiry.
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